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Introduction 
Anthony Kennedy was, as far as one can tell, nobody’s favorite Justice.  
Conservatives have reviled him for voting to uphold Roe, and for his 
consistent support of gay rights.  Liberals, though thankful for his crucial 
votes and opinions in these and other areas, will never forgive him for Bush
v. Gore, Citizens United, and the countless other conservative rulings—
concerning racial equality, gun rights, national power, and much else—for 
which he provided the decisive fifth vote.  And now, they further disdain him 
for retiring during a Trump presidency supported by a Republican Senate. 
The preceding grounds for complaint are mostly political or ideological 
in character.  On one plausible set of priors—that perceived ideological 
purity is incompatible with independence of mind—they should redound 
more to Kennedy’s credit than to his shame.  Accordingly, one might predict 
that legal elites who could claim to value law and judging more than 
outcomes would rate Kennedy more highly than political partisans do.  But 
they generally don’t.  Scholars and public intellectuals from left and right 
have long awarded Kennedy disastrously low marks, deriding his reasoning, 
mocking his writing, and impugning his motives.1  One observer recently 
 1.  See, e.g., Ilya Shapiro, A Faint-Hearted Libertarian at Best: The Sweet Mystery of Justice 
Anthony Kennedy, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 334, 353 (2009) (“agonized, self-aggrandizing 
incoherence.”); David Pozen et al., Did Anthony Kennedy Just Destroy His Own Legacy? POLITICO
(June 27, 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/06/27/anthony-kennedy-legacy-
supreme-court-218900 (“analytically undisciplined”); Andrew Koppelman, The Supreme Court 
made the right call on marriage equality—but they did it the wrong way, SALON (June 29, 2015), 
https://www.salon.com/2015/06/29/the_supreme_court_made_the_right_call_on_marriage_equali
ty—but_they_did_it_the_wrong_way/ (“ponderous self-importance”); Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme 
Leader: On the Arrogance of Anthony Kennedy, NEW REPUBLIC (June 16, 2007) (“self-aggrandizing 
turncoat”); Rich Lowry, America’s Worst Justice, NAT’L REV. (July 1, 2008) (“making it up as he 
goes along”).  Of course, the common wisdom is not uniform.  Almost every Kennedy opinion that 
has provoked criticism has won a defender.  Additionally, several political scientists have written 
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spoke for many, though more gently, when describing Kennedy’s mind as “a 
distant and mysterious country, with its own language and folkways beyond 
the ken of normal Americans.”2
We think the prevailing narrative is wrong.  It is unfair to Justice 
Kennedy.  Much worse, common teaching that Kennedy was an empty robe 
all but guarantees that students of constitutional law will learn nothing of 
value from his long judicial tenure.  That would be a shame.  We think he 
was on to something important. 
“On to” is a key locution here.  Kennedy does not have the grasp of a 
worked out constitutional theory that an academic constitutional theorist 
might strive for.  That’s not expected of our Justices.  And in as much as 
Kennedy does “have a theory,” we don’t find his execution unflawed.  Each 
of us thinks that some of the common complaints have merit.  Even putting 
aside a prose style that does him few favors,3 we would not paint Kennedy 
as the second coming of John Marshall or Robert Jackson or (your preferred 
Justice here).  But, for all that, we think that Kennedy’s constitutional 
decision-making reflects a substantial, albeit imperfect, embrace of a view 
of constitutional law that is coherent, plausible, and worthy of serious 
attention.
In truth, we (or at least one of us)4 thinks it more than plausible.  The 
constitutional theory we attribute to Kennedy (or that we offer as a cleaned-
up and more theorized refinement) is the account that one of us has recently 
introduced and defended elsewhere under the label “principled positivism.”5
So this Article has two linked ambitions: to defend Justice Kennedy against 
what we consider unduly harsh criticism, and to advance the case for a new 
theory of constitutional law by showing how it makes good sense of a large 
largely sympathetic book-lengths studies of Kennedy’s jurisprudence related to liberty.  See 
generally ANTHONY D. BARTL, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE KENNEDY: A
JURISPRUDENCE OF LIBERTY AND EQUALITY (2014); FRANK J. COLUCCI, JUSTICE KENNEDY’S
JURISPRUDENCE: THE FULL AND NECESSARY MEANING OF LIBERTY (2009); HELEN J. KNOWLES,
THE TIE GOES TO FREEDOM: JUSTICE ANTHONY M. KENNEDY ON LIBERTY (2009). 
 2.  Garrett Epps, What Is on Justice Anthony Kennedy’s Mind?, THE ATLANTIC (June 29, 
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/what-is-on-justice-anthony-kennedys 
-mind/489218/.
 3.  See, e.g., Lowry, supra note 1 (“vaporous moralizing”); Jeffrey Rosen, Strong Opinions,
NEW REPUBLIC (July 28, 2011), https://newrepublic.com/article/92773/elena-kagan-writings 
(“[Kennedy’s] prose alternates between bureaucratic and grandiose, resulting in sentences that 
manage to be pompous and clueless at the same time.”); Ian Millhiser, Justice Kennedy Deserves 
this Nasty, Unflinching Sendoff, THINK PROGRESS (June 27, 2018), https://thinkprogress.org/ 
kennedy-was-a-bad-justice-76e464024d78/ (“[Kennedy’s] writing ranged from needlessly flowery 
to completely incoherent.”). 
 4.  This qualifier should be assumed throughout the article whenever views are expressed in 
the first-person plural.  For example, please read “we believe X” to mean that the senior author 
(Berman) believes X, and the junior author (Peters) either believes X too or is, at worst, agnostic. 
 5.  Mitchell N. Berman, Our Principled Constitution, 166 U. PA L. REV. 1325 (2018). 
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and varied array of constitutional opinions that have defied explanation.  We 
hope to persuade readers that these goals are mutually reinforcing. 
The Article proceeds in five parts.  Part I introduces the common 
scholarly wisdom that the body of this Article critically assesses and in large 
measure rejects.  We’re all familiar with the gist.  Kennedy is said to be a 
willful and narcissistic judge, little constrained by law—“an unprincipled 
weathervane,” as one critic put it.6  But that’s vague and conclusory.  Even 
if untrue, it would be hard to rebut without taking on every criticism of every 
opinion, one by one.  To make rebuttal at least feasible, this Part distills 
something like a bill of particulars: a set of more-or-less distinct criticisms 
of Kennedy’s opinions, or flaws they are said to suffer from. 
Part II lays out the constitutional theory that we think makes best sense 
of Kennedy’s constitutional jurisprudence, and that we find independently 
attractive.  Principled positivism maintains that the fundamental 
constitutional matter in our system of constitutional law is not exactly the 
constitutional text or the distinct ratification events that brought the text into 
effect.  Rather, residing at the ground floor of our constitutional system are 
a jumble of weighted constitutional “principles” that resist crisp definition 
but travel under familiar headings such as federalism, separation of powers, 
stare decisis, limited government, human dignity, textualism, and so forth.  
These principles are “grounded in” or “constituted by”—that is, they owe 
their existence to—actual practices of acceptance and endorsement by 
participants in the constitutional venture, paradigmatically including (but not 
limited to) decisions and opinions issued by Supreme Court Justices when 
resolving constitutional cases and controversies.  In turn, the principles (and 
the facts that they make constitutionally relevant) collectively determine or 
make out the constitutional rights, duties, powers, and permissions about 
which we disagree and that constitutional adjudication aims to discover.  In 
short: practices ground principles, and principles deliver rules. 
Parts III and IV return to Kennedy.  Part III makes the prima facie case 
that Kennedy accepts something like principled positivism by demonstrating 
that he has repeatedly affirmed its core tenets.  Part IV then uses the 
analytical frame that principled positivism supplies to assess a large and 
representative sample of Kennedy’s most relentlessly criticized opinions.  
We conclude that his decision-making in five domains ranging across the 
constitutional waterfront—federalism, gay rights, abortion, race, and the law 
of democracy—are reasonably coherent and defensible given his apparent 
theoretical commitments.  To repeat, we don’t deem Kennedy an optimally 
adept and consistent practitioner of principled positivism.  We detect a few 
 6.  Mark Pulliam, Is Justice Kennedy Grooming Himself for Posterity?, NAT’L REV. (June
29, 2016),  https://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/anthony-kennedy-supreme-court-legac 
y-liberal-vote.
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warts, and our study is not comprehensive.  Nonetheless, and contrary to the 
common narrative, we conclude that Kennedy displays at least a partial grasp 
of a genuine—and we think compelling—constitutional theory.  Part V 
briefly takes stock, appraising Kennedy’s constitutional decision-making, 
and principled positivism itself, in light of judgments reached in Part IV. 
This is an article about Justice Kennedy, not Justice Scalia.  Still, Scalia, 
with whom Kennedy shared the high bench for all but two of his thirty-one 
terms, casts a long shadow.  His junior colleague’s most relentless critic, 
Scalia was also the conservative standard against whom Kennedy was most 
ceaselessly measured and found most emphatically wanting.  As far as 
constitutional theory goes, much does distinguish these Justices despite their 
shared conservatism.  Among other things: where Scalia was an originalist, 
Kennedy is a living constitutionalist; where Scalia was a monist, Kennedy is 
a pluralist; and where Scalia was the fierce champion of rules, Kennedy is 
the determined devotee of principles.  In all three respects, Kennedy had the 
better view.  We should regard him more seriously. 
I.  The Common Wisdom 
A.  From “No Theory” to “Personal Whimsy” 
Some critics take Justice Kennedy to task for what they believe he lacks.  
He is said not to possess a “judicial philosophy,”7 or “legal philosophy.”8  He 
has no “theory of jurisprudence,”9 “constitutional theory,”10 or “theory of 
constitutional interpretation.”11
Although we like philosophy and theory as much as the next person, 
these criticisms must be taken with a large grain of salt.  Consider another 
Justice—say, Ruth Bader Ginsburg.  Yes, she is non-originalist, pro-
nationalist, and sympathetic to unenumerated liberties and rights of equality, 
especially concerning sex and gender.  But, those commitments or 
dispositions hardly make up a “theory of constitutional interpretation,” yet 
she is rarely chastised for lacking one. 
So we doubt that Kennedy is most productively criticized for failing to 
develop “a comprehensive, overarching judicial philosophy.”12  Prevailing 
norms and expectations generally allow our Justices to muddle along without 
 7.  Lowry, supra note 1; Epps, supra note 2.   
 8.  Robert F. Nagel, Liberals and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 319, 323 (1992). 
 9.  Rosen, supra note 1. 
 10.  Stephen E. Gottlieb, Three Justices in Search of a Character: The Moral Agendas of 
Justices O’Connor, Scalia and Kennedy, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 219, 238 (1996). 
 11.  Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism and Tribal 
Sovereignty, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1189 (2001). 
 12.  KNOWLES, supra note 1, at 3. 
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conscious grasp of anything properly called a “theory.”  What we demand is 
that they respect a difference (if hard to articulate) between law and politics, 
or that, in the Federalist’s terms, they (try to) subordinate “will” to 
“judgment.”13  And these are the terms in which Kennedy is frequently 
lambasted.  Critics from across the ideological spectrum charge that his 
reasoning in constitutional cases is driven largely by his own moral values 
and personal likes and dislikes, his intuitions and hunches, little constrained 
by anything fairly deemed legal.14  Put otherwise, the more common protest 
is not about what should but doesn’t guide his decision-making (a theory), 
but about what does but shouldn’t—“the prevailing political winds,”15
“specific moral agendas”16 his desperate need “to court the approval of 
Washington elites.”17  Adopting Anthony Bartl’s snappy encapsulation of 
the charge, we’ll call this the personal whimsy thesis.18
B.  Four Claimed Flaws 
Personal whimsy is easy to allege, but hard to rebut without taking on 
each criticism of each decision, one by one.  That would be exhausting, for 
the critics’ indictment involves scores of opinions decided over three 
decades.  Instead, we present a large and representative sampling of the most 
widely and loudly voiced objections, grouping them into four recurring 
criticism-types.  Without pretending to exhaustiveness, we think that many 
or most of the particular complaints about particular moves in particular 
opinions fall into one of four broad types: 
Inconsistency: Kennedy treats premises and arguments inconsistently 
from case to case. 
Mysteriousness: Kennedy invokes premises that have no apparent 
constitutional or empirical grounding. 
 13.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 469 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). 
 14.  As Garrett Epps and Dahlia Lithwick complained, Kennedy’s judgments in key cases—
from abortion to gay rights—seem to have “nothing to do with the Constitution.”  Garrett Epps & 
Dahlia Lithwick, The Sphinx of Sacramento: Will the real Anthony Kennedy please stand  
up? SLATE.COM (Apr. 27, 2007), http://www.slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/12/roy-moore- 
spokeswoman-cnn-host-extreme-politics.html. And now-federal-appellate-court-judge Timothy 
Tymkovic lamented Kennedy’s “ad hoc, activist jurisprudence without constitutional mooring.” 
Timothy M. Tymkovic et al., A Tale of Three Theories: Reason and Prejudice in the Battle over 
Amendment 2, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 287, 333 (1997). 
 15.  Michael S. Paulsen, The Many Faces of “Judicial Restraint,” 1993 PUB. INT. L. REV. 3,
17 (1993).  
 16.  Gottlieb, supra note 10, at 219.  
 17.  Rosen, supra note 1. 
 18.  BARTL, supra note 1. 
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Implausibility: Kennedy relies upon inferences or premises that are so 
implausible as to cast doubt that they represent the genuine grounds or 
bases for his conclusions. 
Obscurity: Kennedy’s reasoning is so hard to follow as (again) to 
suggest that he is moved by considerations that his opinions do not 
capture or reflect. 
1.  Inconsistency
Perhaps the single most common complaint about Kennedy opinions is 
that he changes his mind from one case to another, seemingly unconstrained 
by his own prior positions.  Take Lawrence v. Texas,19 where Kennedy’s 
majority opinion held Texas’s anti-sodomy laws unconstitutional, overruling 
Bowers v. Hardwick.  In the opening of his fervent dissent, Scalia contrasted 
the precedential force that Kennedy afforded Bowers with the precedential 
force the Casey plurality, joined by Kennedy, had given Roe, calling it 
“manipulative” rather than “consistent.”20  Critics also charged that 
Lawrence adopted an approach to substantive due process “plainly 
incompatible” with the test Kennedy had endorsed in previous cases.21
Similar complaints were leveled against Kennedy’s opinion in Gonzales v. 
Carhart,22 which upheld a federal partial-birth abortion ban seven years after 
the Court struck down a similar state statute.  Justice Ginsburg in dissent 
complained that the decision “refuses to take Casey and Stenberg 
seriously.”23  Charles Fried observed tartly that, “Justice Kennedy fails to 
come to grips with his own jurisprudence.”24
Complaints of this form resurface time and again: Kennedy “changed 
his views” on the scope of Congressional power between Gonzales v. Raich
and United States v. Lopez,25 only to reverse course again in NFIB;26 his 
 19.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 20.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586–87 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  And in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, Scalia took pains to point out the inconsistency of Kennedy’s 
abortion jurisprudence: “Among the five Justices who purportedly adhere to Roe . . . two of the 
three, in order thus to remain steadfast, had to abandon previously stated positions.” 505 U.S. 833, 
997 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 21.  Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive Due Process After Gonzales v. Carhart, 106 MICH. L.
REV. 1517, 1525 (2008). 
 22.  Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 23.  Id. at 170 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 24.  Charles Fried, Supreme Confusion, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2007), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2007/04/26/opinion/26fried.html?ex=1335240000&en=16b7f794dd80efcf&ei=5090&part 
ner=rssuserland&emc=rss.
 25.  Jonathan H. Adler, Is Morrison Dead? Assessing A Supreme Drug (Law) Overdose, 9 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 751, 768 (2005).
 26.  See David S. Schwartz, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of 
Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 567, 617 n. 193 (2013) (“Justice Kennedy 
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opinion in Fisher II is “inconsistent not only with Fisher I, but also with his 
previous opinions regarding race-based decision-making,” including Grutter
v. Bollinger;27 his pivotal concurrence in Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 “run[s] directly contrary” to his 
“prior equal protection jurisprudence,”28 and is “internally contradictory”;29
his “Weisman opinion . . . contradicts his argument in Allegheny”;30 and so 
forth.
2.  Mysteriousness   
The mysteriousness objection is a favorite of textualists who wonder 
where Kennedy gets the fundamental legal premises that do so much work 
in his opinions.  Obergefell v. Hodges, which held that states could not 
exclude same-sex couples from the legal institution of marriage, is a well-
known example.  Kennedy’s majority opinion emphasized that the choice to 
marry is a liberty interest “central to individual dignity and autonomy.”31
Chief Justice Roberts raised the mysteriousness criticism in dissent: “[T]he 
majority’s approach has no basis in principle or tradition . . . There is, after 
all, no ‘Companionship and Understanding’ or ‘Nobility and Dignity’ Clause 
in the Constitution.”32
Justice Scalia pressed a similar objection in Boumediene v. Bush, a case 
challenging the Bush Administration’s detention of suspected terrorists at 
Guantanamo Bay.33  Writing for a 5-4 majority, Kennedy relied on 
“fundamental separation-of-power principles” to reject the government’s 
argument that “de jure sovereignty is the touchstone of habeas corpus 
jurisdiction.”34  In dissent, Scalia protested that “The ‘fundamental 
separation-of-powers principles’ that the Constitution embodies are to be 
derived not from some judicially imagined matrix, but from the sum total of 
signed onto an opinion holding that consuming vegetables was quintessential economic activity 
that could be regulated by Congress—a position he would ridicule in NFIB.”). 
 27.  Peter N. Kirsanow, Race Discrimination Rationalized Again, 2015 CATO SUP. CT. REV.
59, 65 (2015) (arguing that reading Fisher v. University of Texas (Fisher II), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 
(2013) and Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), “it seems at times as if 2003 Justice Kennedy 
is dissenting from 2016 Justice Kennedy.”).  
28. Heather K. Gerken, Justice Kennedy and the Domains of Equal Protection, 121 HARV.
L. REV. 104, 115 (2007).  
 29.  Michelle Adams, Stifling the Potential of Grutter v. Bollinger: Parents Involved in Cmty. 
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 88 B.U. L. REV. 937, 987 (2008). 
 30.  Steven G. Gey, Religions Coercion and the Establishment Clause, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV.
463, 500 (1994). 
 31.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015).  
 32.  Id. at 2615–16 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting). 
 33.  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2007). 
 34.  Id. at 755. 
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the individual separation-of-powers provisions that the Constitution sets 
forth.”35  The “general ‘separation-of-powers principles’” that Kennedy 
invoked, Scalia complained, can only be “dreamed up by the Court.”36
Conservatives are not alone in objecting that Kennedy relies upon 
premises of mysterious provenance.  Dean Erwin Chemerinsky castigated 
Kennedy’s Alden v. Maine opinion for “recogniz[ing] a principle nowhere 
stated in the Constitution.”37  Jeffery Toobin complained that Kennedy’s 
decision in Citizen United was premised on “bizarre legal theories”38 that 
Dworkin found “simplistic” and “preposterous.”39
3.  Implausibility
Every justice advances arguments that critics deem unpersuasive and 
even, at least occasionally, wholly implausible.  Although it’s our impression 
that Kennedy has attracted more than his fair share of such charges, that’s 
impossible to establish in short order.  Here are a couple of much-discussed 
examples to convey the flavor. 
Start with Romer v. Evans,40 a widely derided 5-4 decision that struck 
down a state constitutional amendment that had barred the state and its 
departments or subdivisions from prohibiting discrimination against gays, 
lesbians, or bisexuals.  According to Scalia’s dissent, the “central thesis” of 
Kennedy’s majority opinion “is that any group is denied equal protection 
when, to obtain advantage . . . it must have recourse to a more general and 
hence more difficult level of political decision-making than others.”41  But 
this cannot be true as a general rule.42  If it were, “it would be violated by 
every law that imposes a regulation of conduct at other than the most local 
level.”43  Just as implausible, in liberal eyes, was Kennedy’s reasoning in 
Alden, which held that Congress, acting pursuant to its Article I powers, 
could not subject nonconsenting States to private suits for damages in state 
courts.44  Justice Souter in dissent charged that the majority’s historical 
 35.  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 833 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
 36.  Id.
 37.  Erwin Chemerinsky, The Hypocrisy of Alden v. Maine: Judicial Review, Sovereign 
Immunity and the Rehnquist Court, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1283, 1285 (2000). 
 38.  Jeffery Toobin, Bad Judgment, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 22, 2010), https://www.newyork 
er.com/news/news-desk/bad-judgment. 
 39.  Ronald Dworkin, The “Devastating” Decision, THE N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Jan. 28, 
2010), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2010/02/25/the-devastating-decision/.  
 40.  Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 41.  Id. at 639 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 42.  Id. at 639–40. 
 43.  Lino A. Graglia, Romer v. Evans: The People Foiled Again by the Constitution, 68 U.
COLO. L. REV. 409, 426 (1997).  
 44.  Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999). 
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analysis was supported by “no evidence” at all.45  Scholars agreed, deeming 
Souter’s dissent “clearly correct,”46 and describing Kennedy’s federalism 
argument as “nothing short of fanciful.”47
Again, examples could be multiplied.  Take Kennedy’s claim in 
Citizens United that the appearance of corruption will not erode the 
citizenry’s faith in democracy.  Critics ridiculed this premise as an 
“absurdity”48 entirely “removed . . . from political realities.”49  Dissenting in 
Roper v. Simmons, Scalia protested that Kennedy reached “[an] implausible 
result” based “on the flimsiest of grounds.”50  Ginsburg’s Gonzales dissent 
dismissed Kennedy’s assertion that women who have abortions come to 
regret their choices as “an antiabortion shibboleth” that enjoys “no reliable 
evidence.”51  Kennedy’s analysis of the systemic costs of allowing Bivens 
actions in Ziglar v. Abassi is “wholly unsubstantiated,” “staggeringly 
wrongheaded” and, “for lack of a better word, nuts.”52
4.  Obscurity.
A final common objection is that it’s too hard to know just what 
Kennedy is arguing, or what his opinions hold.  George Thomas expressed 
the protest concisely: “Kennedy’s own rhetoric tends to obscure the logic 
that underlies his opinions, even for those who would seek, sympathetically 
but critically, to draw out his reasoning in the benign interest of simply 
understanding it.”53
Kennedy’s opinions in the gay rights cases are notorious examples. In 
Lawrence, Kennedy did not find, as O’Connor would in her concurrence, 
that Texas’s anti-sodomy law violated the Equal Protection Clause.54  But 
neither did he declare adult sodomy a “fundamental right,” as orthodox 
 45.  Alden, 527 U.S. at 761 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 46.  John E. Nowak, Gang of Five & the Second Coming of an Anti-Reconstruction Supreme 
Court, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1091, 1094 (2000). 
 47.  Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a Theory, 75 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1011, 1031 (2000).  
 48.  Michael S. Kang, After Citizens United, 44 IND. L. REV. 243, 246 (2010).  
 49.  Zephyr Teachout, Facts in Exile: Corruption and Abstraction in Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 295, 297 (2011).  
 50.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 608–09 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 51.  Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 183–85 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 52.  Stephen I. Vladeck, Implied Constitutional Remedies After Abbasi, in AM. CONST.
SOC’Y, SUP. CT. REV. 179, 194, 195, 200 (2017).   
 53.  George Thomas, The Curious Case of Justice Anthony Kennedy, THE AMERICAN 
INTEREST (Mar. 1, 2010), https://www.the-american-interest.com/2010/03/01/the-curious-case-of-
justice-anthony-kennedy/.  
 54.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
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doctrine would require.55  Nevertheless, Kennedy found “the Due Process 
Clause” gave the petitioners “full right to engage in their conduct without 
intervention of the government.”56  Although some prominent scholars 
thought Kennedy’s reasoning adequately clear,57 many more deemed it 
“remarkably opaque,”58 “almost incomprehensible,”59 and “a cruel parody of 
the modern make-it-up-as-you-go-along judicial decision-making.”60  And 
in Obergefell, Kennedy’s majority opinion invoked a “synergy between the 
protections”61 of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses to strike 
down state prohibitions on gay marriage.  Chief Justice Roberts declared the 
opinion “quite frankly, difficult to follow,”62 and even fans of the ruling were 
left perplexed.63
The obscurity criticism, however, extends well beyond Kennedy’s gay 
rights decisions.  In the eyes of critics: Casey is “unintelligible,”64 Parents
Involved is “cryptic,”65 LULAC is “bizarrely unclear,”66 Boumediene is 
“Kafkaesque.”67
*** 
 55.  See Randy E. Barnett, Grading Justice Kennedy: A Reply to Professor Carpenter, 89 
MINN. L. REV. 1582, 1583 (2005).  
 56.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.  
 57.  See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. 
Texas, in CATO SUP. CT. REV.: 2002–2003, at 21 (James L. Swanson ed., 2003); Laurence H. Tribe, 
Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV.
1893 (2004). 
 58.  Cass Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and 
Marriage, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 29, n.9 (2003). 
 59.  Calabresi, supra note 21, at 1525. 
 60.  Edward Whelan, The Meta-Nonsense of Lawrence, YALE L.J. (THE POCKET PART), May 
2006, http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-meta-nonsense-of-lawrence.  
 61.  Obergefell v Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015). 
 62.  Id. at 2623 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting).  
 63.  See, e.g., Ilya Somin, A Great Decision on Same-Sex Marriage—But Based on Dubious 
Reasoning, WASH. POST (June 26, 2015); Ariel Schneller, How Justice Kennedy Could Have Baked 
a Better Fortune Cookie, L.A. TIMES (June 29, 2015) http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-oe-0629-
schneller-kennedy-20150629-story.html. 
 64.  Michael Stokes Paulsen, Captain James T. Kirk and the Enterprise of Constitutional 
Interpretation: Some Modest Proposals from the Twenty-Third Century, 59 ALB. L. REV. 671, 675 
(1996).
 65.  Johnathan Fischbach et al., Race at the Pivot Point: The Future of Race Based Policies 
to Remedy De Jure Segregation After Parents Involved in Community Schools, 43 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 491, 492 (2008).  
 66.  Michael S. Kang, When Courts Won’t Make Law: Partisan Gerrymandering and A 
Structural Approach to the Law of Democracy, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097, 1111 (2007) (discussing 
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006)).  
 67.  Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Creating Legal Rights for Suspected Terrorists: Is the Court Being 
Courageous or Politically Pragmatic?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1975, 2039 (2009).  
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In sum, the best objection to Kennedy’s constitutional decision-making 
is less no theory, than it is personal whimsy.  And because personal whimsy
is not his official judicial philosophy, critics infer it from specific flaws they 
find in his judicial opinions.  Most of those putative flaws fall into four 
categories.  Kennedy is said: to reach inconsistent conclusions, on 
inconsistent grounds; to rely upon constitutional premises of mysterious 
provenance, as though conjured from thin air; to assert claims about the 
world, and draw inferences from evidence, that seem wholly implausible; 
and to communicate bits of reasoning, and even holdings, in terms that defy 
understanding.  Accordingly, to significantly rebut the charge of personal
whimsy will require substantial progress in making coherent the inconsistent, 
lucid the mysterious, plausible the implausible, and comprehensible the 
obscure.
The point of collecting and classifying common criticisms of 
Kennedy’s handiwork was not to pile on, but to advance our project in two 
respects.  First, by reminding readers of the large number and diversity of 
opinions that have provoked strident reproach, the exercise makes plain that 
the straightforward approach of responding to criticisms one by one is not 
feasible in a single article: too many cases demand attention.  Second, by 
isolating a small number of fairly distinct criticism types, it creates the 
possibility (one that may or may not be realizable) that we’ll be able to 
leverage in-depth consideration of some decisions (in Part IV) to shed light 
on others that remain offstage.  If the theory that Part II introduces and that 
Part III attributes to Kennedy has resources sufficient to defeat an objection 
of type T in case X, then it may also make headway against T-type objections 
in cases Y and Z.  Thus, this typology of criticisms, however rudimentary, 
will facilitate assessment of charges leveled against Kennedy’s performance 
by enabling us to disambiguate objections that are easily conflated and by 
helping us to anticipate promising responses to recurring criticism types. 
II.  A Theory: Principled Positivism 
Part I distinguished two lines of Kennedy criticism, emphasizing 
personal whimsy over no theory.  But of course these objections are related.  
Sophisticated commentators have disagreed over whether a judge’s embrace 
of, and adherence to, a bona fide “theory” of constitutional interpretation is 
necessary to guard against personal whimsy.68  But nobody should doubt that 
it’s sufficient.  And although Kennedy doesn’t really need any such theory, 
he might in fact—and to commentators’ surprise—actually have one (albeit 
inchoately). 
 68.  Contrast, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE LAW 14 (1997) (judges need a theory) with Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of 
Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 519, 539 (2012) (no they do not). 
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Obviously, Kennedy has not spelled out his theoretical commitments 
with clarity and specificity.  If he had, then the complaint that he has no 
theory would have gained little purchase.  Given that he hasn’t laid things 
out very plainly, one might travel either of two paths if trying to establish 
that, nonetheless, his judicial decision-making is guided and constrained by 
an intelligible general account of constitutional law or adjudication.  One is 
to simply reengage his opinions more closely, systematically, and 
sympathetically, aiming to tease out a coherent view.  That’s hard.  Two 
political scientists who tried concluded that “[t]he more closely one 
examines Kennedy’s Supreme Court jurisprudence, the more confused one 
becomes.”69  The alternative is to first present an account of constitutional 
law as an academic would and then try to show that Kennedy’s performance 
fits this theoretical template, that his decision-making makes more sense, and 
appears in a better light, when viewed as issuing from the proposed theory 
or something in its vicinity.  That’s how we’ll proceed.  The four sections of 
this Part motivate, present, illustrate, and summarize the theory we call 
principled positivism. 
A.  A Little Context 
You say you want a “constitutional theory”?  Well, say more.  What 
type of constitutional theory do you want?  Think of a theory as an extended 
proposed answer to a question of a general and abstract nature.  The theory 
of evolution by natural selection is a proposed answer to some variant of the 
question, “what explains the variety of life on earth?”  As it happens, 
theoretically minded constitutional lawyers and scholars have asked (at least) 
two different sets of questions.  As a result, answers they have furnished 
make out (at least) two different kinds of constitutional theory. 
The more familiar set of questions includes the following: How should 
judges interpret the Constitution?  How should (unelected) judges exercise 
their power of judicial review?  How ought courts resolve constitutional 
disputes?  A second cluster of questions includes these: What are the grounds 
of our constitutional rights and powers?  In virtue of what does our 
constitutional law have the content that it does?  What are the truthmakers of 
true propositions of constitutional law?  Call constitutional theories that 
purport to answer questions of the first type “prescriptive”: they aim to 
prescribe how judges should (or shouldn’t) decide constitutional cases.  Call 
theories addressed to the second type of question “constitutive”: they purport 
to explain how our constitutional rights, powers, rules, prohibitions, and the 
like (collectively, “constitutional norms”) are constituted, or metaphysically 
determined. 
 69.  Patrick D. Schmidt & David A. Yalof, The “Swing Voter” Revisited: Justice Anthony 
Kennedy and the First Amendment Right of Free Speech, 57 POL. RES. Q. 209, 210 (2004). 
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Because the first type of question, and corresponding theory, is more 
familiar than is the second, we should emphasize that the questions that call 
for constitutive accounts are not academic or abstruse.  Lawyers, judges, and 
scholars routinely disagree about propositions of constitutional law.  You 
may believe, let’s imagine, that states are constitutionally free to withhold 
recognition from plural marriages.  We say that they aren’t.  Or we contend 
that the President has constitutional power to pardon himself, and you say 
that he doesn’t.  Disagreements of this sort are common fare.  Plainly, they 
are not all veiled ways of debating what morality requires or what judges 
should rule.70  Rather, their surface grammar suggests that speakers believe 
that there is constitutional law, that propositions about constitutional rights, 
duties, and powers are capable of being true or false and that at least some 
of them are true.  It suggests that participants to the relevant constitutional 
debates (and readers of this Article) are, in Connie Rosati’s terms, 
“constitutional realists.”71
Assuming, that we (or most of us) are constitutional realists, what 
explains our disagreements about “what the law is”?72  Sometimes we 
disagree about what the law is because we disagree about some non-legal 
fact.  We may disagree about what some historical practice was, or about 
what some persons intended, or about what some court said, or about what 
justice requires.  Perhaps more frequently, though, we disagree about what 
the constitutional law is because we disagree about the legal significance of 
some non-legal fact.  We disagree about whether or how much it matters,
legally speaking, that historical practice has been what it was, or that the 
text’s authors intended what they did, or that a court said what it said, or that 
some given practice will or won’t promote justice.  In short, many of our 
disagreements about constitutional law, and especially our most heated 
 70.  For example, we might all agree about how states should treat plural marriages, “morally 
speaking,” disagreeing only about what is required “constitutionally speaking.”  Similarly, we 
could continue to debate the constitutionality of self-pardons even after agreeing or stipulating that 
any challenges to such a pardon would be nonjusticiable. 
 71.  Connie Rosati, Constitutional Realism, in DIMENSIONS OF NORMATIVITY: NEW ESSAYS
ON METAETHICS AND JURISPRUDENCE (David Plunkett, Scott Shapiro & Kevin Toh eds.,
forthcoming 2019).  Two cautions and a clarification.  First, the “realism” here is that of “moral 
realism” or “metaethical realism,” and nearly the opposite of that in “legal realism.”  Second, some 
readers may take “realism” to apply to a domain only if truths within that domain are “mind-
independent” or “stance-independent.”  That is a more demanding conception than Rosati or we 
intend.  Our constitutional realism is “minimally realist” in maintaining only that “there really are 
ways that things might be [constitutionally] speaking and that our thoughts and sentences do 
sometimes correctly represent that reality.”  MARK VAN ROOJEN, METAETHICS: A
CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION 9–14 (2015).  Third, realism entails no position regarding how 
much constitutional law there is, or how many disputed constitutional propositions are true.  It is 
as compatible with Dworkin’s right-answer thesis as with the skeptical claim that answers to nearly 
all constitutional questions that reach appellate courts are underdetermined.   
 72.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
40806-hco_46-2 Sheet No. 23 Side A      12/07/2018   13:09:16
40806-hco_46-2 S
heet N
o. 23 S
ide A
      12/07/2018   13:09:16
BERMAN_FINAL TO PRINTERS 12.6.18 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/6/2018 11:57 AM
Winter 2019] KENNEDY’S LEGACY: A PRINCIPLED JUSTICE 325 
disagreements, concern what makes it the case that our constitutional rights 
and duties, powers and permissions are what they are.  And that, of course, 
is just what a constitutive theory tries to explain.  In so doing, it aims to 
vindicate, not only assume, constitutional realism.  Thus anyone who finds 
herself in a constitutional disagreement should want a good constitutive 
theory of constitutional law.  That’s not all she should want, but it’s 
something important, as constitutional theorists increasingly emphasize.73
That’s our first observation.  Here’s our second: despite a vast literature 
on American constitutional theory, the supply of plausible constitutive 
theories is remarkably short.  This is not the place to substantiate that claim 
in detail.74  Instead, we offer a picture of the cupboard drawn in a few broad 
brush strokes. 
Turn first to the constitutional theory literature. Current scholarly 
fashion distinguishes two schools: originalism and non-originalism (or living 
constitutionalism).  The great majority of contributions over the years—
those associated with scholars such as James Bradley Thayer,75 Herbert 
Wechsler,76 Alexander Bickel,77 John Hart Ely,78 Philip Bobbitt,79 Cass 
Sunstein,80 and David Strauss,81 among many others—are non-originalist.  
They are also, almost without fail, prescriptive on their face.  H.L.A Hart 
was struck by this fact forty years ago, astutely but ruefully describing 
“American speculative thought about the general nature of law” as “marked 
by a concentration, almost to the point of obsession, on  . . . how judges 
reason and should reason, in deciding particular cases.”82
 73.  See, e.g., William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2351 
(2015) (noting and advocating a “positive turn” in constitutional theory); Christopher R. Green, 
Constitutional Truthmakers, NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY. (forthcoming 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2901157; Mark Greenberg, How Facts Make 
Law, 10 LEGAL THEORY 157 (2004), reprinted and revised as SCOTT HERSHOVITZ ED.,
EXPLORING LAW’S EMPIRE ch. 10 (2006). 
 74.  For a longer discussion, from which this section is drawn, see Berman, Our Principled 
Constitution, supra note 5, Part I. 
 75.  James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional 
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). 
 76.  Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1, 16–19 (1959).  
 77.  ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 201 (1962).
 78.  JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 87(1980). 
 79.  PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1982);
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 22 (1991).
 80.  CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT ix (1999). 
 81.  DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 48–49 (2010). 
 82.  H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the 
Noble Dream, 11 GA. L. REV. 969, 969. (1977). 
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From our perspective, the problem with such theories is that their 
prescriptivism runs more than skin deep; most have no clear constitutive 
implications at all.  The first widely discussed academic theory of 
constitutional interpretation—Thayer’s “clear error” theory83—clearly 
illustrates.  Thayer argued that courts should not hold an act of Congress 
unconstitutional unless they are certain of its unconstitutionality beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  This is not an account of the determinants or truthmakers 
of constitutional law, but rather a standard of review.  Or consider Posnerian 
pragmatism, which urges judges to make sensible and workable law in the 
“open area” where “orthodox legal materials run out.”84  Participants to the 
theoretical disputes disagree about what those materials are, how they 
combine, and when they run out.  A constitutive theory aims to resolve these 
puzzlements, but is what Posner conspicuously fails to supply.85  Similar 
things could be said about all the other theories mentioned in the previous 
paragraph.  Indeed, Bobbitt made his anti-constitutivism unambiguous, 
insisting that law “is something we do, not something we have as a 
consequence of something we do.”86
Early originalists were also prescriptive, at least nominally.  Robert 
Bork maintained that Wechsler didn’t take his own “neutral principles” 
seriously enough.  It isn’t sufficient that judges be neutral “in the application
of principles,” Bork argued.  “If judges are to avoid imposing their own 
values upon the rest of us . . . , they must be neutral as well in the definition
and the derivation of principles.”87  To satisfy this requirement, Bork 
exhorted, “[t]he judge should stick close to the text and the [constitutional] 
history, and their fair implications.”88  This language is unambiguously 
prescriptive.  Other first-generation originalists argued in similar terms.89
But originalism, unlike most varieties of living constitutionalism, did have 
constitutive implications that Bork, Scalia, and others would soon make 
 83.  Thayer, supra note 75. 
 84.  RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 15, 324 (2008). 
 85.  See Mitchell N. Berman, Judge Posner’s Simple Law, 113 MICH. L. REV. 777, 778 
(2015).
86.  See BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 79, at 24.   
 87.  Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 
1, 7 (1971). 
 88.  Id. at 8. 
 89.  See Edwin Meese III, U.S. Attorney Gen., Speech Before the American Bar Association 
(July 9, 1985) in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 47, 54 (Steven G. Calabresi 
ed., 2007) (insisting “that only the sense in which the Constitution was accepted and ratified by the 
nation, and only the sense in which laws were drafted and passed, provide a solid foundation for 
adjudication”); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862–63 
(1989) (defending originalism as a “lesser evil” than “nonoriginalism” because it is “more 
compatible with the nature and purpose of the Constitution in a democratic system” and because 
its “practical defects” are less damning). 
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explicit: the norms that make up our constitutional law are all and only what 
the constitutional text says or means, and what it says or means is whatever 
it originally said or meant.90  Put another way, the constitutional law is fully 
constituted by the original meaning of the constitutional text. 
“The constitutional law is all and only what the constitutional text says” 
has a superficial plausibility that can help explain its popularity outside the 
academy.  But it confronts many difficulties if offered as a complete 
constitutive account of American constitutional law, and not just as a slogan.  
To start, it doesn’t jibe well with any widely entertained general theory of 
law.  Ever since Hart demolished John Austin’s “command theory of law” 
over sixty years ago, no legal philosopher has contended that it is a general
truth about law that legal norms are fully determined by what an authoritative 
text says, means, or asserts.  And Hart’s own influential theory of law 
provides no support for monist originalism as a parochial account of 
American constitutional law.  According to Hart, legal norms in a given 
jurisdiction are those norms ultimately “validated” by a convergent practice 
among legal officials, especially judges, that Hart dubs a “rule of 
recognition.”  It is plain that American judges have not converged on 
accepting the original public meaning of the text as the sole determinant of 
constitutional norms.91  Furthermore, and Hart aside, Scalian originalism is 
inconsistent with many constitutional decisions that strike most legal elites 
as correct, even on reflection.92
 90.  See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION 
OF THE LAW 5 (1990) (contending that a judge “is bound by the only thing that can be called law, 
the principles of the text, whether Constitution or statute, as generally understood at the 
enactment.”). See also Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to 
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 551–52 (1994) (“Originalists do not give priority to the plain 
dictionary meaning of the Constitution’s text because they like grammar more than history.  They 
give priority to it because they believe that it and it alone is law.”); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A.
GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 383, 397 & 398 (2012) (arguing 
that “we are governed not by unexpressed or inadequately expressed ‘legislative goals’ but by the
law”; that “the true law is” what an enacted text “states”; and that “it is the text’s meaning . . . that 
binds us as law”) (internal quotation omitted); Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of 
Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 411, 417 (2013) (asserting that “the original meaning of the 
text provides the law that legal decisionmakers are bound by . . . .”). 
 91.  Accounts of existing practices that differ on particulars but align on this key point include 
Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 621 (1987), 
reprinted in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, ch. 1 (Matthew Adler & 
Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Precedent-Based Constitutional 
Adjudication, Acceptance, and the Rule of Recognition, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE 
U.S. CONSTITUTION, supra note. 
 92.  Exhibit A is usually Brown v. Board of Ed. See JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 105 
(2011).  Other purported examples are discussed in, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Supreme Court 
2014 Term—Foreword: Does the Constitution Mean What it Says?, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2015); 
Richard Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1079 (2013); Berman, Our 
Principled Constitution, supra note 5, at 1345–46.  
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Perhaps most significantly, it fits poorly with many constitutional 
sophisticates’ considered judgments that judicial decisions or non-judicial 
historical practices can bear constitutively on the content of our 
constitutional law.  What courts have ruled, and what settled non-judicial 
practices have been, seem to matter in ways that orthodox constitutive 
originalism cannot easily accommodate.  Thus, originalism’s monistic 
premise—that constitutional law is constituted exclusively by the meanings 
of the constitutional text—renders it especially doubtful. 
That’s a picture of what constitutional theorists have produced.  Non-
originalists, overwhelmingly pluralists, have offered varied accounts of how 
judges should exercise their powers of judicial review—many of which we 
find plausible—but no constitutive accounts.  A prominent branch of 
contemporary originalism offers an account that is genuinely constitutive, 
but that most constitutional theorists—including many self-identifying 
“originalists”93—find entirely implausible.  When we shift attention from 
offerings expressly designed for American constitutional law toward the 
scholarly field known as general jurisprudence, the picture is not much more 
promising.  The two leading “theories of law” offered and debated within 
Anglophone general jurisprudence—Hartian positivism and Dworkinian 
interpretivism—do provide just what an American constitutional theorist 
might want: pluralism married to constitutivism.  But both strike most 
American constitutional lawyers as doubtful, albeit for almost diametrically 
opposed reasons. 
Start with Hart who, recall, maintains that law is the set of norms that 
are “conclusively identified” or “validated” by tests that legal officials, 
especially judges, converge in following and accepting from the “internal 
point of view.”94  Even if vaguely Hartian in outlook, many American 
constitutional lawyers and scholars find it hard to fully embrace Hart’s 
account because it is thought to entail that there is much less constitutional 
law than appears correct, even on reflection.  Most constitutional lawyers 
have, at least occasionally, believed two things simultaneously: (1) that thus-
 93.  Tellingly, many of the most influential and sophisticated contemporary originalists avoid 
constitutive claims.  See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial 
Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s Moral Reading of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1269, 1292 (1997); Keith E. Whittington Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 375, 388 (2013).  See also JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM 
AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION 2, 116 (2013); William Baude & Steven E. Sachs, The Law of 
Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1135, n. 331 (2017).  And “new originalists” who may 
have constitutive ambitions find the sledding getting especially rough when working out the 
character and contours of the constraints that govern what they call “constitutional construction,” 
i.e., the process of converting the fixed communicative content of the constitutional text into law.  
See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 
(2013).
 94.  See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, ch. 6 (1961).  
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and-such is a constitutional right, power, or duty, and (2) that Justices and 
other legal officials do not all accept one or another legal premise that serves 
as essential support for (1).  Yet, if Hart’s account of law is correct, then 
belief in (2) should fatally undercut belief in (1).  In Dworkin’s (surely 
exaggerated) encapsulation of the worry, on Hart’s account, “it would follow 
that there is actually almost no law in the United States.”95  But few 
internalize that lesson.  Most constitutional lawyers and scholars believe that 
some legal propositions are true even though the legal premises that make 
them true are controversial among officials. 
Dworkin fixes the too-little-law problem in spades.  According to the 
general jurisprudential theory that he developed most fully in Law’s Empire,
law is the set of norms that flow from principles of personal and political 
morality that best fit and justify the institutional history of the legal regime.  
Put another way, “propositions of law are true if they figure in or follow from 
the principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due process that provide 
the best constructive interpretation of the community’s legal practice.”96
But this account puts pressure on the orthodox understanding among 
American constitutional lawyers that what our constitutional law is, and what 
political morality or justice require, are different questions—even if, on 
some matters, the latter bears contingently on the former.  And sure enough, 
Dworkin would conclude late in life that the theory advanced in Law’s
Empire inevitably leads to a “one-system picture” of the normative 
landscape in which law is a branch of morality,97 and our legal obligations 
and moral obligations cannot conflict.  Although that could be, few 
constitutional lawyers think so.  The core objection to Dworkin, accordingly, 
is nearly an inverse of the standard criticism of Hart: Where Hart leaves us 
with too little law, Dworkin assumes too much morality. 
Where does this drive-by review of a vast literature leave us?  In our 
view, it suggests that one might reasonably want at least four things of a 
constitutional theory—that it: (1) explain how legal rights, duties, powers, 
immunities, and so on are constituted or determined, and not only how judges 
 95.  Ronald Dworkin, Hart’s Posthumous Reply, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2096, 2116 (2017). 
 96.  RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 225 (1986).  Law’s Empire is a work of legal 
philosophy, not a work of American constitutional theory.  When writing in the latter vein, Dworkin 
advocated what he called “the moral reading” of the U.S. Constitution.  See generally RONALD 
DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW (1996).  One of us has observed that “the moral reading” is more 
plainly prescriptive than constitutive and, more importantly, that the two views are not obviously 
compatible. See Berman, Our Principled Constitution, supra note 5, at 1351 n.98; see also Jeffrey 
Goldsworthy, Dworkin as an Originalist, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 49 (2000).  We’re focusing only 
on Dworkin’s general-jurisprudential account.  
 97.  RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS ch. 19 (2011). See also, e.g., Scott 
Hershovitz, The End of Jurisprudence, 124 YALE L.J. 1160 (2015); Mark Greenberg, The Moral 
Impact Theory of Law, 123 YALE L.J. 1288 (2014).  For criticisms, see Mitchell N. Berman, Of 
Law and Other Artificial Normative Systems, in DIMENSIONS OF NORMATIVITY, supra note 71. 
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should decide cases; (2) account for the pluralism that appears to characterize 
our system at a deep level; (3) vindicate the widespread belief that 
constitutional norms and genuine moral norms sometimes (perhaps often) 
conflict; and (4) deliver constitutionally correct answers to at least some 
constitutional questions that are genuinely contested.  As we will see, 
principled positivism satisfies all four desiderata. 
B.  The Account Introduced 
Principled positivism is not only an account of American constitutional 
law, it is an account of law as such.  Like the accounts offered by Hart and 
Dworkin (and by Raz and Finnis, among others), principled positivism is a 
theory about the nature and content of law across jurisdictions.98  This section 
presents the account in three short steps and summarizes. 
1.  Of rules and principles.   
Drawing on Dworkin, let’s recognize two types of constitutional norms: 
“rules” and “principles.”  Although many commentators agree that the terms 
mark some distinction of importance, its precise nature or location remains 
“dogged by confusion and controversy.”99  Indeed, Dworkin himself did not 
make entirely clear precisely how he distinguished the norm types.100  He is 
often read to have associated principles with three criteria or characteristics: 
Legal principles cannot be posited, lack canonical formulation, and have the 
dimension of “weight,” which is to say that they may “bear on” the proper 
legal characterization or treatment of a dispute without even purporting to 
deliver decisive resolution.  For us, this last criterion is the key: principles 
have (finite) weight. 
Rules contrast with principles.  Lacking “weight,” they apply in all-or-
nothing fashion, resolving whatever disputes fall within their terms.  They 
are sufficiently determinate to adequately serve the system’s core conduct-
guidance function.101
Consider a representative sampling of constitutional norms: Legally 
enforced racial segregation in public education is unconstitutional.  Congress 
 98.  Actually, principled positivism is even broader than that.  It is a constitutive account of 
the larger class of artificial normative systems that encompasses legal systems.  See Berman, Our 
Principled Constitution, supra note 5. 
 99.  ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 45 (Julian Rivers trans., 
Oxford Univ. Press ed. 2002). 
 100.  See, e.g., David Lyons, Principles, Positivism, and Legal Theory, 87 YALE L.J. 415, 423 
(1977).
 101.  “Standards” fall on the “rules” side of the rules/principles distinction.  While it is true that 
whether a search is “unreasonable” requires significant evaluative judgment—and thus is a 
“standard” rather than a “rule”—if a search is unreasonable, then it is unconstitutional—thus 
making the norm that prohibits unreasonable searches a “rule” rather than a “principle.” 
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may abrogate state sovereign immunity when legislating pursuant to its 
section five enforcement power.  Criminal defendants have the right to a 
speedy and public trial.  State legislative districts must be equipopulous. 
Government must furnish counsel for indigent criminal defendants.  These 
norms differ in their subject matter, Hohfeldian character, and distance from 
the constitutional text.  But they’re all “constitutional rules.”102  A 
“constitutional rule” can often be stated as an affirmative or negative answer 
to a well-formulated constitutional question presented for certiorari. 
Principles will often be harder or more controversial to identify and 
formulate.  Dworkin considered their lack of canonical formulation a 
defining characteristic.  But paradigmatic and little-disputed examples wear 
their status as principles on their sleeves: separation of powers, federalism, 
sovereign immunity, personal liberty, stare decisis, and so on. 
2.  How principles make rules.103
If there are legal rules and legal principles, what is the relationship 
between them?  The standard view is that rules and principles subsist more 
or less in parallel.  Long ago, Dworkin characterized his debate with H.L.A. 
Hart as concerning whether principles “are binding as law” the same way 
that rules are or, instead, lie “beyond ‘the law.’”  The issue, he said, was 
simply whether “the ‘law’ includes principles as well as rules.”104  His view, 
as David Lyons put it, is that “principles supplement rules.”105  Jack Balkin, 
the constitutional theorist who, after Dworkin, has made most of the 
rule/principle distinction, has a similar view.  For Balkin, whatever the 
precise difference between rules and principles may be, they are alike in that 
both issue from, or are encoded in, the constitutional text: “If the text states 
a determinate rule, we must apply the rule because that is what the text 
provides.  If it states a standard, we must apply the standard.  And if it states 
 102.  We caution that not everything that would be described as a “constitutional rule” by a 
court or in a hornbook is what we mean by the term.  Consider the canonical tiers of scrutiny in 
equal protection jurisprudence, or the Miranda warnings.  These rules, and countless like them, are 
plainly the product of judicial engineering—“implementing rules,” RICHARD H. FALLON, JR.,
IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001), “decision rules,” Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional 
Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004), or “constitutional common law.”  Henry P. Monaghan, 
The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1975). We’re interested in the rules that a judge might plausibly (if not unproblematically) view 
herself as discovering, not those she understands herself to construct.
 103.  With apologies to Greenberg, supra note 73. 
 104.  RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 29 (1977).  
 105.  See Lyons, supra note 100, at 421. 
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a general principle, we must apply the principle.”106  Principles, just like 
rules, are norm-types that “the text enacts.”107
 Principled positivism paints a different picture.  To a first 
approximation, rules are determined by the principles; the principles 
determine the rules.  That’s a little crude, for principles do not determine the 
rules all by themselves.  More accurately, then: rules are determined by 
principles and whatever facts the principles make relevant.  Suppose a 
principle provides that historical practices that have proven stable and 
accepted have legal force (HISTORICAL PRACTICE MATTERS).108  The force it 
exerts on a given constitutional question will depend on facts about what the 
relevant historical practices have been.  The gist, though, is that principles 
are more fundamental than the rules: the rules are what they are—they have 
the contents they have—in virtue of legal principles, but not vice versa.  Call 
this a “layered” view of the rule/principle relationship rather than the 
standard “parallel” view. 
How do principles (and the facts they implicate or make relevant) 
determine rules?  That’s at least two-thirds of the $64,000 question.  We 
cannot defend a complete answer here.  It will be enough to distinguish two 
broad modes by which principles might conceivably underwrite, constitute, 
or deliver rules: by “validation” and by “aggregation.” 
On the validation model, the principles would be structured into a test 
that functions as a complex if-then statement or as a set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions that a putative rule must satisfy to be a valid rule.  On 
the aggregation model, principles bear for or against possible rules, and bring 
about a rule by collectively weighing more forcefully in its favor than in 
favor of any competitor.  Validation is the mode characteristic of computer 
programming and of “lexically-ordered” tests.  Aggregation is the mode 
characteristic of practical reasoning and of “balancing” tests.  Principles 
determine rules by aggregation, not by validation. 
Rules and principles are types of norms; norms are kinds of forces or 
can be analogized to forces (they press or weigh or favor); and forces can 
combine.  Frequently and most simply, we model the combination of forces 
as vector addition.  Because principles weigh or press “in different 
directions”—that is, toward different normative upshots—vector addition is 
a promising model for the determination of rules by principles too.  We 
employ the model of vector addition in the remainder of this paper as a 
simplification that is both tractable and, we hope, close enough.109  What 
 106.  BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 92, at 14. 
 107.  Id.
 108.  From here out, we write PRINCIPLES in SMALL CAPS, and underline rules.   
 109.  For possible complications, see Berman, Our Principled Constitution, supra note 5, at 
1367 & n.144. 
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would make this model “close enough”?  The model is close enough if it 
advances our understanding of matters that it touches upon—matters such as 
the nature of law, the legally proper resolution of particular constitutional 
disputes, and the performance of a long-tenured, much-criticized, and 
exceedingly important Supreme Court Justice. 
3.  How practices make principles.
And what about the principles?  What determines or constitutes them?  
Where do they “come from”?  In virtue of what is a given constitutional 
principle what it is?  To answer this question let us introduce an important 
distinction that our initial discussion of constitutional principles skipped 
past.  Principles come in two types: “derivative” and “fundamental.” 
Suppose that what the text says matters.  Of course, it does.  That (more 
or less) is a constitutional principle: WHAT THE TEXT SAYS MATTERS.
Suppose too that one thing the text says is: “religious freedom matters.”  The 
norm that corresponds to that proposition also is a principle: it has the 
dimension of weight,110 and it participates in the determination of more 
determinate norms—“rules” such as states must exempt religiously 
motivated conduct from burdens imposed by generally applicable laws 
absent a compelling justification. So, we have two principles on our plate: 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM MATTERS and WHAT THE TEXT SAYS MATTERS.  They 
differ in several respects.  For our purposes, the important difference is that 
the former is derivative of, or depends upon, the latter, whereas the latter 
isn’t dependent upon the former and, as far as one would guess, doesn’t 
depend upon any other legal principles. WHAT THE TEXT SAYS MATTERS is 
a fundamental constitutional principle; RELIGIOUS FREEDOM MATTERS is (on 
this hypothetical) a derivative constitutional principle. 
When we discuss principles without qualification, we will have 
fundamental constitutional principles in mind.  So, let’s reformulate the 
question that animated this subsection: how are fundamental constitutional 
principles determined? 
The short answer: they are grounded in “social facts”—facts about 
people’s behaviors and psychological states.111  Mores, fashion, the use of 
 110.  Many critics have argued that principles cannot be posited because their weight cannot 
be posited or promulgated.  See, e.g., DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, at 43–44; Larry 
Alexander & Ken Kress, Against Legal Principles, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN 
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 740 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995).  We think that principles can be promulgated 
but that promulgation does not fix their weights.  A principle’s weight ebbs and flows over time 
with its use and endorsement.  See Mitchell N. Berman, For Legal Principles, in MORAL PUZZLES 
AND LEGAL PERPLEXITIES: ESSAYS ON THE INFLUENCE OF LARRY ALEXANDER (Heidi Hurd ed., 
2018) (forthcoming 2019). 
 111.  Grounding is a non-causal relationship of “metaphysical determination and dependence.”  
Gideon Rosen, Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction, in MODALITY:
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money, market prices, word meanings, rules of prescriptive grammar, 
etiquette, games, religion—all are “the result of human action, but not of 
human design.  They are evolutionary phenomena, in the original meaning 
of the word—they unfold.”112  Think of a simple social norm—say, that you 
ought to wear black at a funeral.  Or consider a rule of prescriptive 
grammar—say, that you ought not to split an infinitive.  These rules are 
grounded in social facts.  A social norm is produced by the way that certain 
people “take it up” by believing and stating that it is normative, by using it 
as a guide for their own conduct, by criticizing themselves and others for 
deviance, and so on.113  This is the standard view of the common law.114
(Fundamental) legal principles arise by being “taken up” by the right 
participants in the system in the right ways.115  Who the right participants are 
and what the right ways are will vary across systems.  Very generally, 
though, the grounding facts involve the ways that those who subscribe to the 
system govern and justify their own judgments and behaviors, and the ways 
they critically assess those of others. 
4.  Summary: Hart + Dworkin = Principled Positivism.
Principled positivism is naturally conceived as an offspring of Hart and 
Dworkin.  With Dworkin, it treats a distinction between determinate legal 
norms (“rules”) and weighty legal norms (“principles”) as central to the 
constitutive account of law.  With Hart, it maintains that the fundamental 
weighty norms are determined entirely by social facts, not by moral facts.  It 
is a positivist account that gives the Dworkinian distinction between 
weighted and non-weighted legal norms its due.116
METAPHYSICS, LOGIC, AND EPISTEMOLOGY 109 (Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann eds., 2010).  
Plausibly: mental phenomena, such as beliefs, intentions, and consciousness itself, are grounded in 
physical brain states; and chemical and mechanical properties (e.g., solvency, hardness, 
conductivity) are grounded in micro-physical facts or properties.  To say that social facts ground 
the norms of fashion is to say that the former are metaphysically more fundamental than the latter 
and participate in making the latter the case. 
 112.  MATT RIDLEY, THE EVOLUTION OF EVERYTHING 4 (2015).
 113.  See, e.g., GEOFFREY BRENNAN ET AL., EXPLAINING NORMS (2013).
 114.  See, e.g., STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 81, at 37 (“The early 
common lawyers saw the common law as a species of custom.  The law was a particular set of 
customs, and it emerged in the way that customs often emerge in a society. . . . [The common law] 
can develop over time, not at a single moment; it can be the evolutionary product of many people, 
in many generations.”). 
 115.  See Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part I), 2 OXFORD U.
COMMONWEALTH L.J. 155, 166 (2002) (arguing that, for “common lawyers . . . , the law in its 
fundament was understood to be not so much ‘made’ or ‘posited’—something ‘laid down’ by will 
or nature—but rather, something ‘taken up,’ that is, used by judges and others in subsequent 
practical deliberation.”). 
 116.  Contra HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 94, at 261–62 (arguing that the 
rule/principle distinction is “incoherent” unless taken to represent differences of degree). 
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Principled positivism maintains that the norms that are sufficiently 
determinate and general to adequately serve the system’s conduct-guidance 
mission are determined by—they gain their contents “in virtue of”—the 
interaction of more fundamental norms of the system whose function is not 
to guide conduct, but rather to participate in the production of the norms 
whose production and maintenance furnish the system’s raison d’être.  In 
broad if imperfect conformity with prevailing usage, we are calling upper-
level, fairly determinate, norms “rules,” and lower-level, rule-determining, 
norms “principles.”  Rules are determined by principles, and principles are 
grounded in social facts.  In legal systems, the principles sit directly on top 
of the grounding social facts, while the rules sit on top of the principles. 
Obviously, rules can change abruptly and purposively because the 
enactment of an authoritative text is a purposive and datable event.  But they 
also change organically because their determinants—the principles—are 
made out by facts about human behavior that are in flux.  Principles are thus 
much like trails: “They continually change—widen or narrow, schism or 
merge—depending on how, or whether, their followers elect to use them.”117
Thus, our constitutional rules change organically because our underlying 
principles do.  They can’t help it, and we can’t stop it (though we can, 
collectively, speed change up or slow it down). 
Recall our imagined constitutional disagreements.  Suppose you are 
right about plural marriage: states are constitutionally permitted not to 
recognize plural marriages.  If this is a rule, it exists in virtue of the balance 
of all implicated constitutional principles.  Maybe, for example, principles 
concerning federalism, historical practice, and gender equality bear more 
forcefully on this issue in the aggregate than do principles of autonomy or 
religious liberty.  Similarly, if we are right that presidential self-pardons are 
constitutional, that might be thanks to principles concerning separation of 
powers or intentions or understandings of framers and ratifiers. 
C.  An Illustration 
What we’ve said so far is abstract.  An example will make it more 
concrete, and an illustration may make it clearer.118
The model that follows, and will reappear in Part IV, aims to depict the 
determination of rules (represented by circles) by principles (represented by 
arrows).  It does not depict the grounding of principles in practices.119  The 
 117.  ROBERT MOOR, ON TRAILS: AN EXPLORATION 17 (2016).  And the Justices of our 
Supreme Court are like the matriarchs of an elephant herd.  See id. at 106–07. 
 118.  This example is taken from Berman, Our Principled Constitution, supra note 5, at 1396. 
 119.  Think of the principles as having emerged over time from a huge number of speech acts 
by countless persons acting in a large variety of constitutional capacities, from Supreme Court 
Justices issuing opinions, to elected officials making speeches, to citizens writing op-eds. 
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width (height) of the arrow depicts its relative weightiness or importance 
within our system of constitutional law.  Relative weights are invariant 
across contexts.  Length depicts the extent to which the principle is activated 
given the relevant facts.  It varies across contexts.  For example, if the 
constitutional text says p very plainly, then textual principles will activate 
very forcefully in direction of p; if a rule q would substantially threaten the 
ability of the states to exercise independent and substantively meaningful 
regulatory authority, the principle STATES MATTER will press forcefully 
against q.  The total force any given principle exerts in favor of a rule is some 
function of its power and the extent of its activation, roughly as the 
gravitational force that a celestial body exerts on an object is a function of 
its mass (invariant) and the intervening distance (variant).  (The principles 
are shaded to loosely reflect the total force that the principle is exerting; 
shading does not add new information but serves to depict more clearly 
information that the length and width, combined, already contain.)  The 
relative size (and intensity of shading) of the contending rules reflect the 
relative net impact of the principles.  The model assumes that a rule obtains 
when the degree of support it receives from all implicated principles exceeds, 
by some unspecified threshold, the support enjoyed by any incompossible 
alternative.
That’s the model.  Here’s the question: Does Congress have 
constitutional power to require state executive or administrative agents to 
enforce or help to administer a federal regulatory scheme?  The Court 
narrowly divided on this question two decades ago, in Printz v. United 
States.120  We think the issue is close. 
It’s close because many constitutional principles are implicated, but the 
bearing of each is uncertain.  Judicial precedents cut in different directions.121
Some framers intended that the federal government would possess some 
commandeering power, but others intended otherwise or had no views on the 
topic.  An untrammeled power to commandeer would threaten state 
independence, but its total absence might impede Congress’s ability to 
accomplish important national ends.  Commandeering could augment 
presidential power at congressional expense, thereby implicating NON-
CONCENTRATION OF POWER, but probably not by much.  There are historical 
precedents for federal commandeering of state agents, but not a lengthy and 
settled practice.  All told, the relevant principles and their activation can be 
approximated by the following snapshot: 
 120.  521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 121.  Compare New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that Congress may 
not require state legislative action), with Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (holding that Congress 
may require state courts to entertain federal causes of action).  
40806-hco_46-2 Sheet No. 29 Side A      12/07/2018   13:09:16
40806-hco_46-2 S
heet N
o. 29 S
ide A
      12/07/2018   13:09:16
BERMAN_FINAL TO PRINTERS 12.6.18 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/6/2018 11:57 AM
Winter 2019] KENNEDY’S LEGACY: A PRINCIPLED JUSTICE 337 
Not everybody finds the question so close.  But disagreements are 
readily explained by different views about the weights of implicated 
principles and the extent of their activation.  One who sides with the Printz
majority likely believes, say, that commandeering threatens the 
independence and autonomy of the states more than this figure represents 
(i.e., the STATES MATTER arrow drives even further to the left).  One who 
sides with the dissent may believe that the framers harbored the legal 
intention that Congress should have this power, and also believe that this 
principle is weightier than shown above (i.e., the rightward-pointing 
AUTHORS’ LEGAL INTENTIONS arrow should be depicted as wider).  These 
are the types of disagreement that principled positivism, and these 
illustrations, can make more salient. 
D.  Summary: Four Core Elements 
Principled positivism is characterized by four features: it is realist, 
pluralist, aggregative, and organic. 
1.  Realism.   
Principled positivism assumes what we have called “constitutional 
realism.” This follows trivially from the facts that it is a constitutive theory, 
and we have defined a constitutive theory as an account that seeks to 
vindicate constitutional realism by explaining the contents of our law.  In 
affirming realism, principled positivism contrasts with two sets of views.  
First, and most obviously, it contrasts with “anti-realist” views that deny the 
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(minimal) reality of constitutional norms.  Recall Bobbitt’s insistence that 
law “is something we do, not something we have as a consequence of 
something we do.”122  Principled positivism rejects that claim; it maintains 
that law is something we both do and have.  Second, realism contrasts with 
positions that, while not denying constitutional realism, do not purport to 
provide resources to vindicate it, or to explain the contents of our 
constitutional norms.  Purely prescriptive constitutional theories that lack 
constitutive ambitions or entailments do not espouse constitutional realism. 
2.  Pluralism.
The legally fundamental determinants of constitutional law, and the 
legally fundamental truthmakers of constitutional propositions, are plural, 
not singular.  Most versions of originalism identify only a single 
consideration or directive that “stands on its own bottom”—something like 
WHAT THE TEXT SAYS IS THE LAW or WHAT THE FRAMERS INTENDED IS THE 
LAW.  Principled pluralism is pluralistic “at the most fundamental level.”123
More particularly, the determinants are instances of a norm type that is 
distinguished by its “weight,” and conventionally termed a “principle.” 
3.  Aggregationism.   
The derivative determinate norms that adjudication seeks to discover, 
announce, and apply—“constitutional rules”—are determined by the 
underlying constitutional principles in a certain way: Many principles may 
bear constitutively on the rule all at the same time.  Constitutional rules are 
determined by the aggregative force of all (applicable) constitutional 
principles.124  This may seem obvious.  If we have a plurality of principles, 
how else?  The “how else,” recall, is by lexical rule, on the model of Hart’s 
rule of recognition (as it is generally understood). 
4.  Organicism.
Constitutional rules can change in gradual, undirected fashion (not only 
by purposive formal means) because they are determined by principles 
which are themselves grounded in legal practices, which are a type of social 
fact.  Law is a human artifact.  Like other social practices (social norms, 
language, systems of exchange, religious beliefs and rituals, on and on), it is 
 122.  BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 79, at 24. 
 123.  Mark Greenberg, The Moral Impact Theory, the Dependence View, and Natural Law
(forthcoming). See also Solum, supra note 93, at 481 (presenting and critiquing the “multiple 
modalities model”). 
 124.  The parenthetical signals that we do not exclude the possibility that principles can interact 
in a fashion that is more complicated than simple aggregation, and that some constitutional 
principles might not apply because they are disabled or not enabled.   
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grounded in facts about human behaviors, speech acts, and psychological 
states.  Because those grounds change organically, so too does the law.  
Living constitutionalism at a fundamental level is inescapable.125
III. Kennedy is a Principled Positivist 
Together, this Part and the next advance a hedged and provisional 
defense of Kennedy’s constitutional adjudication against the charge of 
personal whimsy.  This Part presents evidence, drawn from a wide range of 
opinions, that Kennedy espouses realism, pluralism, aggregationism, and 
organicism—and thus that he’s a principled positivist.  Part IV examines a 
large portion of the decisions that have most fueled the common attacks on 
Kennedy’s performance in constitutional disputes to see whether or to what 
extent they can be made more intelligible and defensible on the hypothesis 
that Kennedy endorses principled positivism. 
A.  Kennedy is a Constitutional Realist
Of course he is.  Almost everyone is.  And no federal judge will confess 
otherwise.  Throughout his judicial career, Kennedy has opined that there are 
correct and incorrect answers to constitutional questions, including many 
that divide appellate courts.  In Texas v. Johnson, for example, Kennedy 
joined the majority to strike a Texas law that criminalized burning of the 
American flag.126  He also concurred separately to explain that “sometimes 
we must make decisions we do not like,”127 but that “[w]e make them 
because they are right, right in the sense that the law and the Constitution, as 
we see them, compel the result.”128
A decade later, Kennedy’s concurrence in City of New York v. Clinton
made much the same point.  There, Kennedy joined a majority opinion that 
held the Line Item Veto Act violated the Presentment Clause.129  Kennedy 
acknowledged that the statute’s objective—“to restrain excessive 
spending”—was “of first importance.”130  But, the statute “must be found 
invalid” because “[t]he Constitution’s structure requires a stability which 
 125.  Accord Robert C. Post, Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law,
117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11 (2003) (“Constitutional law emerges from an ongoing dialectic between 
constitutional culture and the institutional practices of constitutional adjudication.”); H. JEFFERSON
POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION IN HISTORY AND POLITICS
(2002).
 126.  Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1988). 
 127.  Id. at 420 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 128.  Johnson, 491 U.S. at 420–21. 
 129.  Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1997). 
 130.  Id. at 499.  
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transcends the convenience of the moment.”131  Rejecting the pragmatic 
approach proffered by Justice Breyer in dissent, Kennedy concluded that, 
even if the “controls over improvident spending. . . . prove insufficient,” that 
“cannot validate an otherwise unconstitutional device.”132
B.  Kennedy is a (Principled) Pluralist
Kennedy’s enthusiasm for principles is well-known.  To be sure, every 
justice invokes principles.  But (to paraphrase the naturalist JBS Haldane) 
Kennedy’s fondness for them appears inordinate.133  In case after case, 
constitutional domain after constitutional domain, Kennedy’s opinions are 
densely populated by a diverse menagerie of constitutional principles.  They 
range from the broad and familiar principles of “federalism,” “separation of 
powers,” “personal freedom,” and “human dignity,”134 to the narrow or even 
oddball: “the principle . . . that navigable waters uniquely implicate 
sovereign interests”;135 “the fundamental principle . . . that different 
branches of government ‘converse with each other on matters of vital 
common interest’”;136 “the well-established principle that when hurt or injury 
is inflicted on racial minorities by the encouragement or command of laws 
or other state action, the Constitution requires redress by the courts”;137
another “fundamental principle . . . that all persons have access to places 
where they can speak and listen, and then, after reflection, speak and listen 
once more”;138 and others. 
Even more significantly, Kennedy treats (many) constitutional 
principles as legally fundamental: their existence—their legal force—and 
their contents do not depend upon what the text means or what particular 
historical persons intended or believed. 
The disagreement between Kennedy and Scalia in Boumediene
exemplifies their divergent commitments on precisely this point.  Recall that 
Kennedy rejected the Bush administration’s position that “de jure
sovereignty is the touchstone of habeas corpus jurisdiction,” because “that 
position would be . . . contrary to fundamental separation-of-powers 
 131.  Clinton, 524 U.S. at 499. 
 132.  Id. at 452–53.  
 133.  When asked by a group of British theologians “what one could conclude as to the nature 
of the Creator from a study of his creation, Haldane is said to have answered, ‘An inordinate 
fondness for beetles.’” G. E. Hutchison, Homage to Santa Rosalia or Why Are There So Many 
Kinds of Animals?, 93 THE AMERICAN NATURALIST 145, 146, n.1 (1959). 
 134.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).  
 135.  Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, etc., et al., 521 U.S. 261, 284 (1997). 
 136.  Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 326 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 408 (1989)). 
 137.  Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1637 (2014). 
138. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1732 (2017). 
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principles.”139  In dissent, Scalia complained that Kennedy’s invocation of 
“fundamental” principles “distorts the nature of the separation of powers and 
its role in the constitutional structure.”140  That is because, according to 
Scalia, such principles “are to be derived . . . from the sum total of the 
individual separation-of-powers provisions that the Constitution sets 
forth.”141  “It is nonsensical to interpret those provisions themselves in light 
of some general ‘separation-of-powers principles’ dreamed up by the 
Court.”142  Kennedy denies that a principle, if not set forth in the 
constitutional text, can only be “dreamed up” by the Court that enforces it.  
Non-textual principles are often immanent in, and birthed by, the practices 
of the constitutional community. 
C.  Kennedy is an Aggregationist 
We have just said that Kennedy treats constitutional principles as 
fundamental in character.  They are explanatorily prior to (they “determine,” 
“constitute,” or “ground”) the relatively determinate rules that, as a 
constitutional realist, Kennedy sees Supreme Court Justices as trying to 
discover.  But how do principles determine rules?  For Kennedy, as for other 
principled positivists, rules are determined or constituted by the multiplicity 
of principles that combine additively, not lexically.  A rule emerges as the 
outcome of a “battle” among potentially multiple principles. When cases are 
hard, that’s often because various principles are pressing, with greater or 
lesser force, in opposite directions.  Furthermore, rulings are often narrow 
because the broader the announced rule, the greater the likelihood that it fails 
accurately to capture the balance of activated principles. 
We will see this dynamic at work next section in several of Kennedy’s 
most maligned opinions.  For now, a few examples from Kennedy’s lesser-
known (though still controversial) opinions exemplify.  In Harmelin v. 
Michigan, Kennedy’s concurring opinion derived “[t]he Eighth Amendment 
does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence” from 
DEMOCRACY, FEDERALISM, and SEPARATION OF POWERS.143  In Powers v. 
Ohio, prosecutors may not use race-based peremptory challenges regardless 
of defendant’s race is a function of PERSONAL DIGNITY and JUDICIAL 
INTEGRITY.144  And in Zivotofsky v. Kerry, the President has preclusive 
power over recognition reflects the net effect of a diverse lot of principles: 
 139.  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 755 (2007). 
 140.  Id. at 833 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
 141.  Id.
 142.  Id.
 143.  Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 998, 1001 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added).  
 144.  Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1999). 
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WHAT THE TEXT SAYS, JUDICIAL PRECEDENT, HISTORICAL PRACTICE, and
PRAGMATISM, among others.145
D.  Kennedy is an Organicist
Although not a capital punishment abolitionist, Kennedy has authored 
two prominent majority opinions holding the death penalty 
unconstitutional—as applied to minors,146 and as punishment for any sexual 
assault not resulting in death.147  Both opinions relied heavily on “evolving 
standards of decency,” generating a small flurry of commentary extolling (or 
deriding) Kennedy as a “living constitutionalist.”148  We are confident that 
he is.  But living constitutionalism comes in many flavors, and the Eighth 
Amendment death penalty cases are compatible with most.  Many 
originalists have emphasized just this point.149  If, for example, the original 
meaning had been “prohibit what is objectively cruel,” then a judicial posture 
that attends to “evolving standards of decency” might be justifiable on the 
assumption that evolving community standards are the best (if fallible) guide 
to what is objectively cruel. 
What is distinctive of Kennedy, and central to principled positivism, is 
the idea that our principles depend upon, are constituted by or grounded in, 
actual practices and mental states of constitutionally relevant actors (from 
Supreme Court justices to elected officials; opinion leaders to ordinary 
citizens), and thus change as those facts change.  This was, famously, the 
second Justice Harlan’s view.  As he argued in his influential Poe dissent: 
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content 
cannot be determined by reference to any code.  The best that can 
be said is that through the course of this Court’s decisions it has 
represented the balance which our Nation, built upon the 
postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck 
between that liberty and the demands of organized society . . .  The 
balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this country, 
having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from 
 145.  Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084, 2086, 2090, 2093 (2015). 
 146.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005). 
 147.  Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008). 
 148.  See e.g., Lisa K. Parshall, Embracing the Living Constitution: Justice Anthony M. 
Kennedy’s Move away from a Conservative Methodology of Constitutional Interpretation, 30 N.C.
CENT. L. REV. 25, 74 (2007) (extolling); Adam Lamparello & Charles E. MacLean, Originalism 
and the Criminal Law: Vindicating Justice Scalia’s Jurisprudence-and the Constitution, 50 AKRON
L. REV. 227, 263 (2016) (deriding).  
 149.  See, e.g., Lee J. Strang, Originalism and the “Challenge of Change”: Abduced-Principle 
Originalism and Other Mechanisms by Which Originalism Sufficiently Accommodates Changed 
Social Conditions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 927, 955 (2009).
40806-hco_46-2 Sheet No. 32 Side A      12/07/2018   13:09:16
40806-hco_46-2 S
heet N
o. 32 S
ide A
      12/07/2018   13:09:16
BERMAN_FINAL TO PRINTERS 12.6.18 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/6/2018 11:57 AM
Winter 2019] KENNEDY’S LEGACY: A PRINCIPLED JUSTICE 343 
which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke.  
That tradition is a living thing.150
Poe concerned due process.  But the thought is general.  “One need not 
be a rigid partisan of Blackstone,” Harlan would later emphasize, “to 
recognize that many, though not all, of this Court’s constitutional decisions 
are grounded upon fundamental principles whose content does not change 
dramatically from year to year, but whose meanings are altered slowly and 
subtly as generation succeeds generation.”151
Justice Kennedy, along with Justices O’Connor and Souter, endorsed 
Harlan’s Poe dissent explicitly and enthusiastically in their Casey joint 
opinion.152  Kennedy has championed this organic dynamism in opinions on 
diverse subjects ever since.  Over time, our principles grow and shrink, 
morph and splinter, as members of the constitutional community—judges, 
legislatures, and others—engage in a “recurring dialogue” that drives the 
“elaboration and the evolution” of the law.153  As “new insights and societal 
understandings” emerge, the constitutional community gains “a better 
informed understanding” of principles that “once passed unnoticed and 
unchallenged.”154  As “judicial exposition . . ., in common-law fashion, 
clarif[ies] the contours” of our constitutional principles,155 they “acquire[] 
over time a power and an independent significance” that “become part of our 
constitutional tradition.”156  Contrast this picture of the organic development 
of our principles with Justice Breyer’s claim that judicial review “requires 
applying constant constitutional principles to changing circumstances.”157
Kennedy (like Harlan) attributes to our constitutional principles an 
evolutionary character that Breyer’s more static picture denies. 
 150.  Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 151.  Desist v. U.S., 394 U.S. 244, 263 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 152.  See Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992) (plurality 
opinion).  This was Part II of the opinion, generally regarded as having been written by Kennedy.  
JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 54 (2008). 
 153.  Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 326–27 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 154.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2071, at 2602–03 (2015). 
 155.  J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 885 (2011). 
 156.  Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 100 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  See also Louis 
D. Bilionis, Grand Centrism and the Centrist Judicial Personam, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1353, 1354 
(2005) (attributing to Kennedy a “jurisprudence that holds that there are such shared American 
values, that constitutional adjudication can be guided by them, and that the Supreme Court must 
nurture them and keep them popularly accessible”). 
 157.  STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 73 (2010). 
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IV.  Personal Whimsy through a Principled Positivist Lens 
This Part examines the extent to which the conceptual frame and 
apparatus that principled positivism supplies, the tenets of which Kennedy 
appears to endorse, can make intelligible and defensible his performance in 
those opinions that have attracted the fiercest criticism. 
Which are those?  There’s the rub.  A determined advocate of personal
whimsy could plausibly introduce a few dozen Kennedy opinions into 
evidence.  And we have discovered no consensus “bottom ten.”  So we’ll 
have to be selective.  This Part surveys Kennedy’s performance in five 
domains of constitutional law: federalism, gay rights, abortion, affirmative 
action, and the law of democracy.  We think that more will be learned by 
contextualizing the supposedly worst decisions.  And, we’ve selected these 
fields because, collectively, they cover both structure and rights, include a 
disproportionate number of opinions that have attracted the broadest or most 
vociferous criticism, and were targeted by critics from the left and from the 
right in nearly equal measure. 
This approach necessarily omits entire doctrinal areas worthy of study, 
including expressive and religious liberties, and criminal justice.  Resources 
are limited, and we have given reasons for focusing our attention as we have.  
Still, we acknowledge this study’s limitations.  A more comprehensive 
survey could leave Kennedy looking less good than we perceive him to be.  
Or better.  Either way, the incompleteness of our investigation would worry 
us more if we ended up concluding, based on the cases we do examine, that 
the objections are entirely without merit.  That’s not our conclusion. 
So much for this Part’s coverage.  Now a word in anticipation of its 
strategy.  Given Kennedy’s apparent embrace of the four planks of principled 
positivism, you may already anticipate how possible defenses of Kennedy 
against some of the charges that we canvassed in Part I might run.  For 
example, much of Kennedy’s supposed inconsistency takes the form of the 
claim that, given that he treated consideration P as decisive in Case A, he 
was inconsistent to flout it in Case B.  But aggregationism problematizes that 
line of argument: Case A might be as notable for the presence of Principle P 
as for the absence of Principles Q and R.  Or a consideration may be activated 
in two cases, but to significantly varying degrees.  Similarly, many criticisms 
that we label “mysteriousness” object that it’s unclear where an invoked 
principle “comes from.”  But this is just what organicism ensures: like other 
evolutionary phenomena, our fundamental principles cannot be traced to 
distinct sources.  They’re more like soccer (of diverse and indistinct origins) 
than basketball (invented by Dr. James Naismith in 1891).  Furthermore, a 
better understanding of the analytical framework might make some of 
Kennedy’s more cryptic reasoning easier to comprehend.  And it might even 
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induce some of his critics to chalk up any remaining obscurity to bad writer
or clunky thinker, criticisms far less damning than personal whimsy.
The goal of this section is to investigate the extent to which such 
potential defenses can be made out.  We’ll submit that Kennedy’s 
performance in many of his most notorious opinions, read and reconstructed 
sympathetically (but not sycophantically), reflect a reasonably consistent and 
broadly defensible approach to constitutional decision-making. 
A.  Federalism 
As a staunch supporter of “states’ rights” throughout his career on the 
Court,158 Kennedy has attracted criticism from commentators less solicitous 
of state interests.  But those are ordinary disagreements, not bases to allege 
personal whimsy.  If any of Kennedy’s federalism opinions would find itself 
on a community-wide bill of indictment, that would be his majority opinion 
in Alden v. Maine,159 which held that Congress may not use its Article I 
powers to subject nonconsenting states to private suits for damages in state 
courts.  It provoked a storm of outrage.  Chemerinsky, for example, called 
the decision “the height of judicial hypocrisy” based on nothing more than 
“a value choice” that Kennedy and his fellow conservatives “cannot possibly 
justify.”160
We think the condemnation largely unwarranted.  We believe that 
Kennedy’s overall decision-making on federalism displays both a fair grasp 
of a sound framework for analysis, and a plausible (though contestable) 
appreciation for the shape, contours, and weights of our constitutional 
federalism principles.  We further believe that Alden represents a plausible 
(though contestable) decision given how the principles appear to him. 
Suppose, as the previous Part argued, that Kennedy is a principled 
positivist.  What should we expect to see in his federalism decisions?  First, 
given his pronounced pro-states leanings, we should expect him to reliably 
espouse one or more weighty principles favoring states’ rights or interests.  
Second, insofar as he’s a pluralist, we might expect him to acknowledge 
 158.  Justice Kennedy has voted with the conservative majority to limit federal power in every 
major federalism case: on Congress’s commerce and spending powers (see, e.g., United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1994); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. 
Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012)), commandeering of state authorities (see, e.g., New 
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), state 
sovereign immunity (see, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Alden v. Me, 527 
U.S. 706 (1999)). These are the headliners, not a comprehensive list. 
 159.  527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999). 
 160.  Chemerinsky, supra note 37, at 1286; see also Vicki C. Jackson, Principle and 
Compromise in Constitutional Adjudication: The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign 
Immunity, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 953, 953 (2000) (“The Court’s Eleventh Amendment and 
sovereign immunity case law deserves the condemnation and resistance of scholars.”). 
40806-hco_46-2 Sheet No. 33 Side B      12/07/2018   13:09:16
40806-hco_46-2 S
heet N
o. 33 S
ide B
      12/07/2018   13:09:16
BERMAN BERMAN_FINAL TO PRINTERS 12.6.18 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/6/2018 11:57 AM
346 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 46:2 
other federalism principles that favor nationalist interests.  Third, insofar as 
he’s an aggregationist, we might predict that he would conceptualize 
federalist principles as coming into conflict and might occasionally conclude 
that they dictate legal outcomes that are more moderate or nationalist than 
other defenders of states’ rights favor.  Fourth, insofar as he’s an organicist, 
Kennedy might recognize that the shape and force of the relevant federalist 
principles have shifted over time.  All four predictions are borne out. 
Kennedy’s concurrence in Lopez exemplifies.  There, the Court held, 5-
4, that the federal Gun-Free School Zone Act (GFSZA), which criminalized 
possession of firearms near schools, exceeded Congress’s commerce 
power.161  Kennedy joined Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion.  He 
also concurred (joined by O’Connor) precisely to caution against intimations 
in the majority opinion that, in the name of protecting state prerogatives, 
threatened undue harm to federal prerogatives. 
The thrust of Kennedy’s concurrence is that our federalism principles 
are multiple, not univocal.  On the one hand, states are independent 
sovereigns that play a central role in protecting individual liberty and in 
satisfying varied demands of their citizens.  On the other, the national 
government has power sufficient to the needs of a nation state.  “The 
Commerce Clause grants Congress extensive power and ample discretion to 
determine its appropriate exercise.”162  To assign intentionally imprecise and 
capacious labels, call these principles STATES MATTER and EFFECTIVE 
NATIONAL POWER, respectively.  They form part of “the constitutional 
design” and are, in a sense, “enduring.”163  But they are not static.  They 
“evolve” as the Court’s jurisprudence responds to changes in the economy 
and society, and to efforts by the political branches to preserve and adjust a 
responsible “federal-state balance.”164  Development of these principles has 
not followed “a coherent or consistent course.”165  But there are “essential 
principles now in place respecting the congressional power to regulate 
transactions of a commercial nature.”166  They include a judicial commitment 
“to sustaining federal legislation on broad principles of economic 
practicality.”167
If our plural and partially conflicting constitutional principles determine 
our constitutional powers and rights, the statute’s constitutionality turns 
upon the relative force or impact of the complementary principles STATES
 161.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549. 
 162.  Id. at 568 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 163.  Id. at 568.  
 164.  Id. at 574, 577–78. 
 165.  Id. at 568. 
 166.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 574. 
 167.  Id. at 571.  
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MATTER and EFFECTIVE NATIONAL POWER.  In Kennedy’s judgment, STATES 
MATTER activated forcefully against the GFSZA.  “While the intrusion on 
state sovereignty may not be as severe in this instance as in some of our 
recent Tenth Amendment cases, the intrusion is nonetheless significant.”168
As the majority opinion emphasized, if the GFSZA stands, “it is difficult to 
perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law 
enforcement or education where States historically have been sovereign.”169
Contrariwise, “[a]bsent a stronger connection or identification with 
commercial concerns that are central to the Commerce Clause,” EFFECTIVE
NATIONAL POWER did not weigh heavily in the statute’s favor.170  Moving 
from the balance of principles to a ruling on the statute, without interposing 
a judicially created “test” or “doctrine” of broader generality, Kennedy 
jumped straight to his (constitutionally realist) bottom line: “The statute 
before us upsets the federal balance to a degree that renders it an 
unconstitutional assertion of the commerce power.”171
Kennedy reiterated his pluralism on matters of federalism one month 
later in Term Limits, joining the four liberals to hold that states lack 
constitutional power to impose term limits on their representatives in 
Congress.172  Justice Thomas authored the dissent on behalf of the 
conservatives. “Nothing in the Constitution,” Thomas protested, “deprives 
the people of each state of the power to prescribe eligibility requirements for 
the candidates who seek to represent them in Congress.”173  “Because the 
people of the several States are the only true source of power, . . . [w]here 
the Constitution is silent about the exercise of a particular power . . . the 
Federal Government lacks that power and the States enjoy it.”174 As he had 
in Lopez, Kennedy penned a separate concurrence, this time to object that 
the dissent’s “course of argumentation runs counter to fundamental 
principles of federalism.”175  Those principles are plural: “That the States 
may not invade the sphere of federal sovereignty is as incontestable . . . as 
the corollary proposition that the Federal Government must be held within 
the boundaries of its own power when it intrudes upon matters reserved to 
the States.”176
 168.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 583. 
 169.  Id. at 564.  
 170.  Id. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 171.  Id. at 580. 
 172.  U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
 173.  Id. at 845 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 174.  Id. at 847–48. 
 175.  Thornton, 514 U.S. at 838 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 176.  Id. at 841. 
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Given Kennedy’s embrace of multiple federalism principles, we should 
expect that he’d see them pulling in different directions on the issue raised 
in Alden: STATES MATTER suggests immunity; EFFECTIVE NATIONAL POWER 
suggests abrogability.  And given his state-protective dispositions, we should 
find ourselves neither surprised nor outraged if he concludes that, on net, 
these two principles weigh more heavily for, than against, a rule of state 
sovereign immunity.  Much simplified, that’s what happened. 
That’s a simplification because STATES MATTER and EFFECTIVE
NATIONAL SUPREMACY weren’t the only principles that Alden implicated.  
One obvious additional principle is WHAT THE TEXT SAYS MATTERS.
Kennedy acknowledged that it weighed against immunity, but abjured 
reliance “on the words of the Amendment alone.”177  What the framers 
intended to codify (even if the language chosen did not effectively 
communicate that intention) also matters.178  So too does historical practice.  
No single principle is determinative nor do all principles point in the same 
direction.  But STATES MATTER and EFFECTIVE NATIONAL POWER are the 
main drivers.  The former, Kennedy reasons, is activated substantially: 
[A]n unlimited congressional power to authorize suits in state 
court to levy upon the treasuries of the States for compensatory 
damages, attorney’s fees, and even punitive damages could create 
staggering burdens, giving Congress a power and a leverage over 
the States that is not contemplated by our constitutional design.  
The potential national power would pose a severe and notorious 
danger to the States and their resources.179
At the same time, EFFECTIVE NATIONAL POWER does not strongly press 
for a non-abrogation rule because many means remain available to secure 
state compliance with federal law.180  So the sum of the activated principles 
weigh in favor of a robust sovereign immunity rule that Congress lacks 
power, under Article I, to subject nonconsenting states to private suits, as the 
following picture conveys: 
 177.  Thornton, 514 U.S. at 730. 
 178.  That is because, what the text means and what the authors of that text intended to achieve
by enacting that text are not one and the same. Rather, they are distinct clusters of principles that 
carry independent weight.  See Berman, Our Principled Constitution, supra note 5, at 1386–87 & 
1387 n.200.  The principles may be aligned, but, as Kennedy recognizes in Alden, needn’t be.  
 179.  Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 750 (1999). 
 180.  Id. at 755–57, 759 (discussing alternate means of enforcement). 
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Given Kennedy’s priors, that strikes us as a reasonable analysis.  But if 
not, why not?  What grounds have we to infer personal whimsy?  The 
objection that Souter pressed most vigorously in dissent sounds in 
implausibility.  Kennedy, Souter argues, is wrong on the history: the original 
legal intention of the framers may have been to constitutionalize a “common 
law” principle of sovereign immunity in state courts that is defeasible by 
federal statute, but surely was not to constitutionalize a “natural law” version 
of the principle that Congress could not abrogate by exercise of its Article I 
powers.  Kennedy’s reasoning is fallacious, this objection goes, because it 
relies upon implausible historical premises.181
We find Souter’s analysis of the relevant history mostly persuasive.  But 
we think that he and fellow critics exaggerate its force.  The objection holds 
great sway on the supposition that the Alden majority derives its rule of non-
defeasible state sovereign immunity from the supposed constitutional 
principle that the framers’ legal intentions matter, along with the supposed 
historical facts that the framers intended to codify just that rule.  Because the 
framers did not intend to codify indefeasible sovereign immunity, the 
 181.  Alden, 527 U.S. at 795 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“It is clear enough that the Court has no 
historical predicate to argue for a fundamental or inherent theory of sovereign immunity as limiting 
authority elsewhere conferred by the Constitution or as imported into the Constitution by the Tenth 
Amendment.”). 
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objection goes, the majority’s rule is entirely unsupported.  This criticism 
has merit, but less, we think, than first meets the eye, for LEGAL INTENTION
is a less dominant note in Kennedy’s opinion than Souter appreciates.182
Kennedy’s chief contention is not that the framers intended that 
Congress would lack power to abrogate state sovereign immunity in state 
courts, but rather that they intended that states would be independent 
sovereigns with power and status sufficient to enable them to serve as 
bulwarks against excessive concentration of power, and to satisfy needs of 
their citizens that can be met more effectively by subnational governments.  
This principle of independent state authority has retained vitality over time: 
“[O]ur federalism requires that Congress treat the States in a manner 
consistent with their status as residuary sovereigns and joint participants in 
the governance of the Nation.”183  It requires robust immunity from suit in 
the waning days of the twentieth century as a modest counterweight to the 
vast expansion of national regulatory power, at state expense, in our post-
Wickard, post-Garcia world.184
The suggestion that the state immunity rule derives not from what the 
text says or what the framers intended, but from somewhat freestanding and 
evolving principles of state authority provokes the second objection to 
Alden: mysteriousness.  Chemerinsky put the complaint succinctly: “The 
primary problem with Kennedy’s argument is that it has a principle nowhere 
found in the Constitution.”185  But Kennedy’s response must be obvious: of 
course the decision relies on principles not found “in the Constitution.”  It’s 
not “in” the constitutional text that fundamental principles are found!  (Who 
does Chemerinsky think Kennedy is—Justice Thomas?)  So while 
Chemerinsky is right that Kennedy relies upon principles “nowhere found 
‘in the Constitution,’” that’s an ineliminable aspect of an approach in which 
the most fundamental constitutional norms are grounded directly in practices 
of legal actors, including judges and ordinary citizens.  That’s what 
organicism gets you. 
 182.  Cf. Alden, 527 U.S. at 763, 763 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“I am assuming that the Court 
does not put forward the theory of the ‘fundamental aspect’ as a newly derived conception of its 
own, necessarily comprehended by the Tenth Amendment guarantee only as a result of logic 
independent of any intention of the Framers.”).  
 183.  Id. at 748.  
 184.  Souter’s critique models the majority’s analysis roughly as follows: FRAMERS’ INTENT + 
[facts about what the framers did intend]  states have immunity from private suit, not abrogable 
by Article I powers.  But Kennedy has a different analytical structure in mind, one that is less 
vulnerable to competing readings of eighteenth-century history: STATES MATTER + [facts about the 
existing balance of power between the national government and the states]  states have immunity 
from private suit, not abrogable by Article I powers.  
 185.  Chemerinsky, supra note 37, at 1294. 
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Put differently, Souter maintains that Kennedy’s opinion “turns on 
history.”186  That’s true, but not exactly as Souter intends.  For Kennedy, the 
history that matters is not fixed in the late eighteenth century.  Rather, as 
Ernie Young observed, “[p]articular pieces of historical evidence—such as 
statements by the Framers in the ratification debates or The Federalist—are 
employed to confirm the presence of the broad principle.”187  “But it is the 
principle itself,” and not any precise piece of historical evidence, “that does 
most of the work in deciding the case.”188 Thus, the evolving “history of legal 
and political theory . . . illuminate[s] the meaning of the constitutional 
plan”189 and delivers the “principle of sovereign immunity as reflected in our 
jurisprudence.”190  Kennedy’s decision in Alden, then, reflects his more 
general embrace of the “organic development of social institutions.”191
So we are little moved by common complaints that Alden is implausible
or mysterious.  What criticism is left?  One possibility holds that Kennedy 
gets the force of the relevant principles wrong.  Recall that the force a 
principle exerts for or against a putative legal rule or ruling is a function of 
two variables: the principle’s relative weight or importance within the 
system, and the extent to which it is activated or implicated given the facts.  
If Kennedy gave short shrift in Alden to constitutionally relevant federal 
interests, it could be because he deemed those interests less weighty than 
they are, or because he deemed those interests less implicated or threatened. 
We think that both these things are true—in Alden and more generally.  
First, we think that the rule Alden discerns and announces impedes national 
supremacy more than Kennedy believes.192  Furthermore, by our lights, 
Kennedy undervalues the importance of federal interests routinely, and 
across doctrinal contexts: Kennedy misdescribes and substantially 
underweights the nationalist principles at stake in NFIB;193 his Boerne
opinion displays insufficient appreciation for Congress’s special role in 
 186.  Alden, 527 U.S. at 763 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 187.  Ernest A. Young, Alden v. Maine and the Jurisprudence of Structure, 41 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1601, 1630 (2000).  
 188.  Id.  Of course, this doesn’t relieve Kennedy of the obligation to show his work—to 
explain how and why the principles that he espies control as they do—and Young gives him low 
marks on that score.  Id. at 1665.  See infra Part V.
 189.  Id.
 190.  Alden, 527 U.S. at 757 (emphasis added). 
 191.  Young, supra note 187, at 1604.  
 192.  See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 47, at 1012 (pointing out that the “Court fails to 
acknowledge” how the rule in Alden “harm[s] legitimate national objectives.”). 
 193.  See Berman, Our Principled Constitution, supra note 5, at 1402 n.247.  We agree that 
Kennedy’s vote in NFIB is inconsistent with his vote in Raich and find the NFIB dissent’s attempt 
to distinguish away Raich scandalously bad.  Id.  But the puzzle might be more Kennedy’s vote in 
Raich than it was his subsequent abandonment of Raich in NFIB. See Michael D. Ramsey, 
American Federalism and the Tragedy of Gonzales v Raich, 31 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 203 (2012). 
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enforcing the Reconstruction Amendments;194 and his unfortunate opinion 
for the Court in Abassi reflects a stark under-appreciation for the importance 
of principles that we’ve been calling EFFECTIVE NATIONAL POWER.195  In 
short, we think that our principles of national power are broader and 
weightier than Kennedy does.  But this is the stuff of ordinary constitutional 
disagreement, not grounds to prosecute for personal whimsy.
B.  Abortion 
One year after arriving on the Court, Kennedy joined Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s plurality opinion in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services
that announced four Justices’ intention to reconsider Roe.196 Two years later, 
when Justice Thurgood Marshall retired and was replaced by Justice 
Clarence Thomas, most Court-watchers agreed that the Court had five solid 
votes (Rehnquist, Scalia, White, Thomas, and Kennedy) to overrule Roe at 
the next available opportunity.  The next opportunity arose that very term, in 
Casey, a case challenging provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control 
Act.197
In the event, conservative hopes were dashed.  In a shocking joint 
opinion,198  Kennedy, O’Connor, and Souter wrote to uphold what they 
characterized as Roe’s “central holding”: that women have a constitutionally 
protected interest in terminating an unwanted pregnancy.199  All the same, 
they replaced Roe’s rigid trimester framework with a less onerous “undue 
burden” test.200
The Casey dissenters reacted with fury.  Scalia was at his angriest, 
damning Kennedy and his co-authors with personal whimsy in unequivocal 
terms: “[T]he best the Court can do to explain how it is that the word ‘liberty’ 
must be thought to include the right to destroy human fetuses is to rattle off 
a collection of adjectives that simply decorate a value judgment and conceal 
a political choice.”201  In our view, occasional wince-worthy rhetoric aside, 
and making allowances for the infelicities that (sometimes) attend co-
authorship, the joint opinion is a credible effort. 
 194.  See Michael H. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne 
v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 174 (1997) (“[T]he Boerne majority viewed congressional action 
as an irrelevance, if not an impertinence.”). 
 195.  See Vladeck, supra note 52. 
 196.  492 U.S. 490 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 197.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 841 (1992). 
 198.  Kennedy is reported to have initially voted to overrule Roe at the Justices’ conference in 
Casey. EDWARD P. LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE 
EPIC STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 470 (1998).
 199.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 853 (plurality opinion).  
 200.  Id. at 874.  
 201.  Id. at 983 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter agreed that abortion regulations 
implicate two principal principles: a principle that the state must respect the 
liberty and autonomy interests of the pregnant woman, and of women who 
may become pregnant,202 and a principle that the state may act to promote, 
and express respect for, the life of the unborn.203  This latter principle follows 
from a more general principle that the people of a state may act through the 
law to express and advance their deeply held moral commitments.  So 
abortion restrictions present two principles in conflict: a principle of 
LIBERTY, and a principle of DEMOCRACY.  (This puts matters grossly, but 
nuance isn’t needed at this point.) 
The joint opinion suggests that its authors may have differing (or 
unsettled) views about which principle would outweigh the other in a case 
of first judicial impression.  But Roe had already held that bans on abortion 
from conception are unconstitutional.  So a third principle was implicated: 
STARE DECISIS.  And the authors of the joint opinion all agreed that the 
aggregate weight of these three principles dictated that banning abortion is 
unconstitutional, whatever the relevant balance might have been had they 
been writing on a blank judicial slate.  This judgment is reflected in the 
dynamic depicted on the left edge of the image below. 
 202.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 869 (plurality opinion). (“[A] woman’s liberty to determine whether 
to carry her pregnancy to full term”). 
 203.  Id. at 871 (“[T]he State’s ‘important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality 
of human life.’”) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973)). 
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But that wasn’t the end of the story.  The possible constitutional rules 
here are not limited to two: states may criminalize abortion from conception, 
and restrictions on abortion are constitutionally prohibited during the first 
trimester.  There are countless possibilities. O’Connor had floated a distinct 
one in her 1983 dissent in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive 
Health: regulations on abortion are permissible, even during the first 
trimester, if they do not impose an undue burden on the ability of a woman 
to terminate a pregnancy.204  The Casey joint opinion concluded that the 
aggregate weight of the principles favored O’Connor’s undue burden rule 
over Roe’s trimester rule because the former gains more in the coin of 
DEMOCRACY than it loses in the coins of LIBERTY and STARE DECISIS,
combined.  This judgment is reflected in the dynamic depicted on the right 
side of the image above.  (The top side shows that the case does not present 
a cycling problem: just as the net weight of principles favors the undue 
burden rule over Roe’s trimester rule, so too does it favor undue burden over 
a pro-life rule that conservative critics of Roe favor.)  Put differently, the 
 204.  Akron v. Akron Ctr. For Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 452 (1983) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting).
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“undue burden” standard optimizes the applicable constitutional principles 
better than either the “compelling interest” test that Roe endorsed or the 
complete elimination of the abortion right. 
That’s how we understand the joint opinion.  In support of his personal
whimsy charge, Scalia threw the kitchen sink of objections—inconsistency
(Kennedy and O’Connor “abandon[ed] previously stated positions”),205
mysteriousness (their “new mode of constitutional adjudication” is “nothing 
more than philosophical predilection”),206 implausibility (the joint opinion’s 
analysis of stare decisis is “contrived”),207 and obscurity (there is no way to 
know what is or is not an “undue burden,” because the standard is a “verbal 
shell game”).208  Many commentators agreed.209
Tackling all these objections would consume too much space.210  We’ll 
concentrate on the nub: that if justices abandon text and longstanding (fairly 
specific) traditions as the sole determinants of our constitutional law, then 
they can be guided only by their own personal value judgments.  That’s a 
reasonable worry, but this version of the objection recognizes too few 
alternatives.  Organicists maintain that fundamental constitutional principles 
change over time as commitments of participants in constitutional practice 
do.  By their nature, evolving commitments and practices are contestable.  
But that does not entail that informed observers cannot get them right, or that 
claims about the contents and weights of evolving constitutional principles 
must be projections of personal preferences.  (An observer of fashion, 
etiquette, or grammar can correctly discern what the norms of those domains 
have become, even while decrying them.)  And though Americans plainly 
disagree over the bottom-line moral permissibility of abortion, and about the 
moral status of the fetus at various stages of gestation, the joint opinion’s 
judgment that matters “central to personal dignity and autonomy” are 
covered by our constitutional principles of liberty, and that such matters 
encompass decisions related to procreation is hardly wacky.  We think it’s 
correct. 
 205.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 997 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 206.  Id. at 1000.  
 207.  Id. at 993.  
 208.  Id. at 987. 
 209.  See, e.g., Robert F. Nagel, Nationhood and Judicial Supremacy, in CHRISTOPHER WOLFE
ED., THAT EMINENT TRIBUNAL: JUDICIAL SUPREMACY AND THE CONSTITUTION 22 (2004);
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
995, 1040 (2003). 
 210.  For some responses, see Laurence H. Tribe, The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not 
Speak Its Name, 177 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1927, 1928 (2004); Ronald Dworkin, The Center Holds!,
N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, (Aug. 13,  1992), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1992/08/13/the-center-
holds/#fnr-8.   
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Eight years after Casey, the Court first encountered legislative bans on 
abortion procedures that medical professionals call “dilation and evacuation” 
(D&E) and “dilation and extraction” (D&X) and that abortion opponents call 
collectively “partial-birth abortion.”  In Stenberg v. Carhart,211 the Court by 
a 5-4 margin invalidated a Nebraska statute that criminalized performance 
of a “partial birth abortion,”212 reasoning that the “Nebraska law . . . does not 
directly further an interest ‘in the potentiality of human life’ by saving the 
fetus in question from destruction, as it regulates only a method of 
performing abortion.”213  Kennedy dissented and took issue with the 
majority’s characterization of the state’s interest, arguing that “Nebraska was 
entitled to find the existence of a consequential moral difference” between 
abortion procedures.214  According to Kennedy, the decision “contradicts 
Casey’s assurance that the State’s constitutional position in the realm of 
promoting respect for life is more than marginal.”215
Congress responded to Stenberg by passing the Partial-Birth Abortion 
Act, which proscribed “partial-birth abortion” nationwide.  When a 
challenge to the Act reached the Supreme Court in the form of Gonzales v. 
Carhart,216 O’Connor had retired and been replaced by the pro-life Samuel 
Alito, producing five votes to uphold the ban.  Kennedy wrote the majority 
opinion, reasoning that the ban does not unduly burden either pre- or post-
viability abortions because other methods of abortion remain available—
including most D&E procedures, which the Court interpreted the Act not to 
cover.217  Furthermore, the ban does not have the purpose of placing a 
substantial obstacle in the path of women choosing an abortion because 
animated by the legitimate purpose of promoting respect for life. 
Now it was the liberals’ turn to cry foul.  The chief objection, voiced 
first in Justice Ginsburg’s impassioned dissent, was inconsistency.218
 211.  Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
 212.  Id. at 922.  Because the statutory definition of “partial birth abortion” did not reference 
specific procedures, O’Connor’s concurrence explained that “the D&E procedure is included in 
this definition,” and “it is not possible to interpret the statute’s language as applying only to the 
D&X procedure,” as Kennedy’s dissent insisted.  Id. at 949 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 960 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Nebraska seeks only to ban D&X.”). 
 213.  Id. at 930.  
 214.  Id. at 962 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 215.  Id. at 964.  
 216.  Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 150 (2003).  
 217.  The federal statute, like Nebraska’s, applied to “partial-birth abortion,” rather than to 
specific medical procedures.  But, according to the majority, the federal statute defined the 
procedure more specifically than did its Nebraska counterpart so as to proscribe only D&X—
referred to by the majority as intact D&E—and not all D&E procedures.  Id. at 150–51.  Ginsburg’s 
dissent questioned this interpretation. Id. at 181 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 218.  Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 190–91 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  A second objection attached to 
Kennedy’s ruminations that “some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they 
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Kennedy starts the analysis portion of the majority opinion by establishing 
the terms of debate: “Whatever one’s views concerning the Casey joint 
opinion, it is evident [that] a premise central to its conclusion [is] that the 
government has a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and 
promoting fetal life.”219  That interest, he says, requires upholding the Act. 
Ginsburg agrees that Casey recognized the state’s interest in preserving and 
promoting fetal life.  “But,” she insists, “the Act scarcely furthers that 
interest: The law saves not a single fetus from destruction, for it targets only 
a method of performing abortion.”220  Thus, she observes, the majority here 
“admits that ‘moral concerns’ are at work . . . untethered to any ground 
genuinely serving the Government’s interest in preserving life.”221  And that, 
Ginsburg concludes, is a striking departure from Casey.  By allowing such 
moral concerns to justify restrictions on the abortion right, “the Court 
dishonors our precedent.”222
We agree with Ginsburg that a ban on intact D&E that allows standard 
D&E does little to protect fetal life.  We also agree that Kennedy’s majority 
opinion does occasionally characterize Casey as having positioned a state 
interest in protecting fetal life against the pregnant woman’s liberty 
interests,223 and that Casey did say those things.  But that’s not all that Casey
said, or that Gonzales said that Casey said. Casey itself made clear that 
DEMOCRACY militated for the state’s ability (speaking for the majority of its 
citizenry) to express respect for fetal life: “The woman’s liberty is not so 
unlimited . . . that from the outset the State cannot show its concern for the 
life of the unborn.”224
Kennedy is consistent when asserting in Gonzales that Casey “confirms 
the State’s interest in promoting respect for human life.”225 Indeed, because 
once created and sustained,” and that “[s]evere depression and loss of esteem can follow.”  Id. at 
159–60.  Many readers found that speculation baseless and offensive.  See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin,
The Court & Abortion: Worse Than You Think, THE N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, (May 31 2007), 
http://proxy.library.upenn.edu:3406/articles/2007/05/31/the-court-abortion-worse-than-you-think 
/#fnr-3.  We share that assessment, but don’t think it does much work in Kennedy’s analysis.  It 
was a gratuitous unforced error. 
 219.  Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 145. 
 220.  Id. at 181 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 221.  Id. at 182. 
 222.  Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992) and 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003)). 
 223.  See, e.g., id. at 145 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 846) (“And third is the principle that the 
State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman 
and the life of the fetus that may become a child.”)).  
 224.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 869. See also id. at 877 (“[T]he State may . . . express profound respect 
for the life of the unborn.”); Gonzales, 550 U.S at 146 (“[T]he State may . . . express profound 
respect for the life of the unborn.”) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 877)).  
 225.  Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 163.  
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the post-Roe decisions “had ‘undervalue[d] the State’s interest in potential 
life,’”226 a “central premise” of Casey was that “[t]he government may use 
its voice and regulatory authority to show respect for the life within the 
woman.”  And, according to Kennedy, that is what banning a procedure that 
Congress found “disturbing” achieved: “The Act expresses respect for the 
dignity of human life.”227
That clarified, we can understand Kennedy’s Gonzales opinion in terms 
of the three core Casey principles: LIBERTY, DEMOCRACY, and STARE 
DECISIS.  The last exerts little force here, according to Kennedy, because 
Stenberg is distinguishable and because Casey establishes the framework for 
analysis without dictating a particular conclusion.  Thus, whether the 
legislative ban constitutes an “undue burden” depends upon the relative force 
of the first two principles.  Kennedy concludes that DEMOCRACY favors the 
constitutionality of the ban more than LIBERTY favors its unconstitutionality.  
This is because the cost to liberty interests of upholding the Act is measured 
by its actual impact (small),228 whereas the cost to democracy of striking it 
down is measured, in part, by the ban’s expressive significance to its 
proponents (large).229  The balance of principles looks something like this: 
 226.  Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157 (plurality opinion) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 873)). 
 227.  Id. at 157–58.  
228.  Id at 166–67 (“The Act is not invalid on its face where there is uncertainty over whether 
the barred procedure is ever necessary to preserve a woman’s health, given the availability of other 
abortion procedures that are considered to be safe alternatives.”).  As was the case in Alden, we 
think Kennedy’s Gonzales decision understates the cost of the countervailing principle.  Whereas 
there Kennedy found the rule concerning state sovereign immunity posed no great threat to 
NATIONAL SUPREMACY; here, he concludes that the ban does not implicate or activate principles 
concerning LIBERTY. In both cases, we see these principles activating more than Kennedy 
acknowledges.  See supra notes 192–193 (discussing Alden and NATIONAL SUPREMACY);
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 172 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing the federal statute implicates women’s 
liberty interests more than the Court appreciates because it “forces women to resort to less safe 
methods of abortion”).  
 229.  In both Stenberg and Gonzales, the laws vindicated the governments’ “critical and 
legitimate role in legislating on the subject of abortion, as limited by the woman’s right.”  Stenberg 
v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 956–57 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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The rules announced in Casey and Gonzales illustrate Kennedy’s 
recognition that “the principles do not contradict one another,” and that all 
should be given effect.230  Kennedy’s attempt to do so strikes us as broadly 
defensible, though obviously disputable.  Given that both the liberal and 
conservative camps of the Court may fairly be criticized for slighting 
genuine constitutional principles that bear on abortion regulations,231
Kennedy’s position is not obviously any more subjective or whimsical than 
those of any other Justice. 
C. Gay and Lesbian Rights 
Whereas Kennedy has been a secondary voice (though frequently a 
decisive vote) on federalism and abortion, he has been the leading player on 
gay rights.  By common accounting, the Supreme Court has decided three 
pivotal gay rights cases during Kennedy’s thirty-year tenure—Romer, 
Lawrence, and Obergefell—and Kennedy authored the majority opinion in 
 230.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. 
 231.  In Casey, the conservatives in dissent refused to countenance a woman’s protected liberty 
interest. Compare id. at 980 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The issue is whether [abortion] is a liberty 
protected by the Constitution of the United States. I am sure it is not.”), with id. at 871 (plurality 
opinion) (“The woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy before viability . . . is a  . . . component 
of liberty we cannot renounce.”).  In the partial-birth abortion ban cases, the liberals ignored the 
State’s interest in protecting, promoting, and expressing respect for, prenatal life. Compare
Gonzalez, 550 U.S. at 181 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing the federal Act “scarcely furthers” 
any legitimate state interest), with Casey, 505 U.S. at 871 (plurality opinion) (prior decisions have 
“given [state interests] too little acknowledgement and implementation.”). 
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all.232  Each has attracted withering criticism: Romer “defies logic”;233
Lawrence is “a tissue of sophistries embroidered with a bit of sophomoric 
philosophizing”;234 and Obergefell “has no more basis in the Constitution 
than did the naked policy preferences adopted in Lochner.”235  We assess 
here whether that criticism is warranted. 
Romer arose as a challenge to a Colorado state constitutional 
amendment that provided that discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation was permissible and could be made impermissible only by 
subsequent amendment.236  Kennedy wrote the opinion for the Court striking 
it down.  Notice how the opinion starts: 
One century ago, the first Justice Harlan admonished this Court 
that the Constitution “neither knows nor tolerates classes among 
citizens.”  Unheeded then, those words now are understood to 
state a commitment to the law’s neutrality where the rights of 
persons are at stake.  The Equal Protection Clause enforces this 
principle and today requires us to hold invalid a provision of 
Colorado’s Constitution.237
This is the key: the amendment offends against a principle of NON-
SUBORDINATION or ANTI-CASTE.  That is not the only principle of relevance; 
HISTORICAL PRACTICE MATTERS is also lurking about, for instance.  But 
ANTI-CASTE (or something similar) does most of the work.  Romer is a 
difficult case and not a clearly reasoned opinion.238  So we are simplifying.  
That said, the simplified idea is that the amendment is unconstitutional 
because its practical consequences, and its intended and probable social 
meaning, are to reinforce subordinate social status of gay, lesbian, and 
 232.  There are other opinions, most notably United States v. Windsor, where Kennedy 
authored the majority opinion striking down the federal Defense of Marriage Act. 133 S. Ct. 2675 
(2013).  Though not discussed here, the opinion further exemplifies Kennedy’s pluralist, 
aggregationsist approach.  See, e.g., Ernest Young & Erin C. Blondel, Federalism, Liberty, and 
Equality in United States v. Windsor, 2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 117 (2013) (arguing that 
Kennedy’s majority opinion combines federalism and equal protection principles).  
 233.  Graglia, supra note 43, at 426.  See also Tymkovic, supra note 14. 
 234.  Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 MICH.
L. REV. 1555, 1557 (2004).  See also Whelan, supra note 60 (calling Lawrence “unfettered moral 
philosophizing” and “meta-nonsense”). 
 235.  Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2621 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting).  
 236.  Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 237.  Id. at 623 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559, (1896) (dissenting opinion))  
 238.  Cf. Lynn A. Baker, The Missing Pages of the Majority Opinion in Romer v. Evans, 68 U.
COLO. L. REV. 387, 389 (1997) (“[T]he majority reached the right result, but for reasons that it 
articulated only partially or not at all.”). 
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bisexual members of the polity.  That offends a weighty principle, and is not 
outweighed by other principles pointing in the opposite direction. 
That, we think, is the crux of Kennedy’s reasoning.  It confronts two 
main objections, of implausibility and inconsistency.  First, the reasoning is 
so shoddy as to undermine the candor of its author.239  Second, the result is 
incompatible with Bowers.240
The main target of the implausibility charge is what Scalia, in a 
blistering dissent, deems “the central thesis of the Court’s reasoning,” to wit, 
“that any group is denied equal protection when, to obtain advantage (or, 
presumably, to avoid disadvantage), it must have recourse to a more general 
and hence more difficult level of political decision-making than others.”241
This is a sharp-edged thesis—in our terminology, a “rule.”  And thus 
construed, Scalia objects, it is untenable in “any multilevel democracy.”  
“For whenever a disadvantage is imposed, or conferral of a benefit is 
prohibited, at one of the higher levels of democratic decision-making. . . the 
affected group has (under this theory) been denied equal protection.”242  Yet 
in many cases the conclusion that the discrimination offends the Constitution 
seems utterly implausible.  “To take the simplest of examples,” Scalia 
proposes,
[C]onsider a state law prohibiting the award of municipal 
contracts to relatives of mayors or city councilmen.  Once such a 
law is passed, the group composed of such relatives must, in order 
to get the benefit of city contracts, persuade the state legislature—
unlike all other citizens, who need only persuade the municipality.  
It is ridiculous to consider this a denial of equal protection, which 
is why the Court’s theory is unheard of.243
Scalia’s argument is good, taken on its own terms.  It is implausible to 
maintain, in a rulish way, that it is unconstitutional to withdraw issues that 
particular affect some persons or groups to a higher level of decision-making.  
But it is not obvious that Kennedy’s “central thesis” is best read as Scalia 
 239.  Romer, 517 U.S. at 653 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today’s opinion has no foundation in 
American constitutional law, and barely pretends to.”). 
 240.  Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting), 
 241.  Id. at 639. 
 242.  Id. Note that in the sentences immediately following his formulation of the majority’s 
“central thesis,” Scalia twice characterizes it as a “principle.”  Id.  It is important for the rest of his 
argument, however, that Scalia treat the thesis he attributes to Kennedy as a determinate norm (what 
we’re calling a “rule”), and not as a norm with weight (what we’re calling a “principle”).  Were 
Kennedy’s supposed central thesis recharacterized as a principle, then it could not be disproven by 
Scalia’s counter-examples. 
 243.  Id.
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construes it.  What Kennedy wrote was that: “A law declaring that in general 
it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek 
aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in 
the most literal sense.”244 That seems right.  A legal declaration of this sort 
would be a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense.
But that doesn’t entail that this law quite amounts to such a declaration or 
that it constitutes a denial of equal protection in the legal sense.  That 
depends on the balance of all relevant principles.  And the central principle, 
Kennedy clearly announced at the get-go, is (roughly) ANTI-CASTE.
If the shape of a constitutional rule is determined by the aggregate 
bearing of multiple principles, Scalia’s example bolsters Kennedy’s case 
rather than undermining it.  Those on the short end of Scalia’s imagined 
stick—the relatives of municipal officeholders—strikingly do not constitute 
a socially inferior class or caste.  It is more than plausible that the combined 
force of ANTI-CASTE and EQUAL POLITICAL ACCESS (to put a name to the 
principle that both the Colorado state constitutional Amendment 2 and 
Scalia’s hypothetical state law infringe or offend against) establish that the 
former is unconstitutional even if the latter isn’t.245
So we do not find the implausibility charge compelling.  The 
inconsistency objection has greater force: Romer is hard to square with 
Bowers.  “If it is constitutionally permissible for a State to make homosexual 
conduct criminal,” Scalia reasoned, “a fortiori it is constitutionally 
permissible for a State to adopt a provision not even disfavoring homosexual 
conduct, but merely prohibiting all levels of state government from 
bestowing special protections upon homosexual conduct.”246  Of course, a 
charitable response on Kennedy’s behalf is that avoiding this inconsistency 
was not so pressing as to outweigh the combined force of ANTI-CASTE and 
EQUAL POLITICAL ACCESS, and that whether Bowers could withstand the 
force of principles weighing in favor of a right to engage in homosexual 
sodomy could await a more appropriate occasion.  But we agree with others 
 244.  Romer, 517 U.S. at 633. 
 245.  Our take resonates with Akhil Amar’s defense of Kennedy’s Romer opinion. See Akhil 
Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer’s Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REV. 203 (1996).  Amar 
concluded that the “sociology and the principles underlying the Attainder Clause”—what he 
deemed a “nonattainder principle” that “tap[s] into basic principles of separation of powers and 
equal protection”—explains Kennedy’s invalidation of Amendment 2.  Id. at 203–04, 210.  Amar’s 
“nonattainder principle,” then, is analogous in shape and effect to what we have deemed an ANTI-
CASTE principle.  Perhaps the main difference is that whereas Amar, a textualist, ties his principle 
to a specific provision of the Constitution (the Attainder Clause), a principled positivist such as 
Kennedy is not quite so limited (and may also believe that, in some analyses, the text serves more 
as decoration than as engine). 
 246.  Romer, 517 U.S. at 640–41 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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that the failure of Kennedy’s opinion even to mention Bowers warrants 
criticism.247
In any event, a more appropriate occasion to reconsider Bowers arose 
several years later, in Lawrence.248  And Kennedy took it, writing for five 
justices to overrule the earlier decision.249  We reckon that Lawrence is easy 
for almost any principled positivist who, like Kennedy, believes that our 
constitutional regime includes robust principles that broadly concern liberty 
and that evolve organically.250  Without pretending to an unrealizable degree 
of precision or nuance, here are three more-or-less distinct principles, and 
associated labels: LIBERTY (people should be free to pursue happiness as they 
conceive it), AUTONOMY (the state should promote the development of 
people’s capacities and opportunities to lead autonomous and meaningful 
lives), and EQUAL DIGNITY (the state should treat all people with equal 
respect, and not act to demean or denigrate).251  Assuming these count among 
our constitutional principles, their force on these facts is not elusive: People 
have powerful liberty interests in having sex with consenting others, and in 
building relationships that involve acts of sexual intimacy.252  Furthermore, 
the effect and social meaning of a ban on gay and lesbian sex are 
extraordinarily demeaning and denigrating.253  Pointing the other way is 
STARE DECISIS.  But that is “not an inexorable command”254—i.e., it’s a 
principle—and it would be bizarre if those who believe that LIBERTY,
 247.  Eric J. Segall, Reconceptualizing Judicial Activism as Judicial Responsibility: A Tale of 
Two Justice Kennedys, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 709, 744 (2009); Thomas C. Grey, Bowers v. Hardwick
Diminished, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 373, 373-74 (1997).  But see Amar, supra note 245, at 227–28 
(arguing that, thanks to the status/conduct distinction, Bowers was far removed).
 248.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 249.  Justice O’Connor concurred, for a sixth vote to vindicate Lawrence’s constitutional 
rights.  But she would have rested solely on equal protection grounds, thus not formally upsetting 
Bowers. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).  
 250.  Lawrence’s pronouncements on liberty are sweeping.  See e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 
562 (“Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, 
and certain intimate conduct.”).  
 251.  In discussing Kennedy’s abortion decisions, we lumped the cluster of similar but distinct 
principles under a single heading entitled LIBERTY. See supra Part IV.B. Here, we engage in a 
modest degree of splitting.  The reason for this is that the existence of similar, mutually reinforcing, 
but non-identical principles of LIBERTY, AUTONOMY, and DIGNITY is significant in the gay rights 
cases, as it wasn’t in the abortion cases.  
 252.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (noting the “emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial 
protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to 
sex.”).
 253.  Id. at 575 (“Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct 
protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects” because “[w]hen 
homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an 
invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private 
spheres.”).
 254.  Id. at 577. 
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AUTONOMY, and DIGNITY represent genuine principles of American 
constitutional law at the start of the twenty-first century did not also conclude 
that, on this issue, they outweigh STARE DECISIS by a significant measure. 
Sure, you might have a very different constitutive theory.  You might 
deny that the ground floor of our constitutional order consists of multiple, 
dynamic principles.  But that is a jurisprudential disagreement, if a fairly 
deep one.  It’s not an objection adequate to underwrite personal whimsy—at
least so long as we want not to defame everyone with whom we strongly 
disagree.  Yet personal whimsy is the charge that Scalia levels in his 
characteristically heated dissent, and that many commentators reiterate.  To 
support that strong thesis, Kennedy’s critics press obscurity, implausibility,
and inconsistency.
The obscurity charge targets Kennedy’s supposed incomprehensible 
justification for the final rule. Scalia carped that “principle and logic have 
nothing to do” with the Court’s decision and that most of Kennedy’s opinion 
has “no relevance to its actual holding.”255  Scholars leveled the same 
criticism. Sunstein called the majority opinion “remarkably opaque.”256
Nelson Lund and John McGinnis complained that it “simply abandons legal 
analysis.  Freed from the chains even of rational argument, the Lawrence
Court issued an ukase wrapped up in oracular riddles.”257  Although the 
opinion is unlikely to win its author any writing awards, we think its gist 
clear enough: Prohibiting gay and lesbian adults from engaging in 
 255.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586, 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 256.  Sunstein, supra note 58 (asking rhetorically, “What Did Lawrence Hold?”). 
 257.  Lund & McGinnis, supra note 234, at 1574.  See also id. at 1614 (“[F]ew decisions in its 
entire history are so poorly reasoned.”). 
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consensual sex acts is a grievous insult to principles of liberty, autonomy, 
and dignity.  What’s so hard to figure out? 258
A superficially more promising objection sounds in implausibility.
Orthodox substantive due process doctrine holds that a restriction on a liberty 
interest that does not qualify as a fundamental right must be upheld if 
rationally related to any legitimate state interest.  Because Kennedy did not 
say that anybody had a fundamental right to engage in any of the 
criminalized sex acts, and because he concluded that “the Texas statute 
furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the 
personal and private life of the individual,”259 observers inferred that the 
Court held that the law was subject to, and failed, the rational basis test.  But 
that amounted to the conclusion—wholly implausible in the eyes of many—
that promoting majoritarian moral norms is not even a legitimate interest.  
Scalia deemed “the contention that there is no rational basis for the law here 
under attack” “the ground on which the Court squarely rests its holding,” and 
dismissed it as “out of accord . . . with the jurisprudence of any society we 
know.”260
Even if the proposition is absurd, we think it less clear than Scalia does 
that it grounded the Court’s holding.  Kennedy’s concluding sentence is 
ambiguous.  Scalia interprets it to mean “the statute furthers no legitimate 
state interest, full stop.”  And he thinks that a crazy claim because promoting 
the community’s moral values is surely a legitimate interest.  But an 
alternative interpretation of Kennedy’s conclusion is available: “the statute 
furthers no legitimate state interest sufficient in importance to justify this 
intrusion.”  So construed, we think the contention is not only plausible but 
plainly true. 
Scalia thinks this interpretation unavailable because our settled 
doctrinal tests don’t allow for this type of sliding-scale balancing.  In contrast 
to European-style proportionality review, our doctrine delivers only three 
tracks for analysis.  Because the majority did not maintain that the liberty 
interests at stake qualify for “intermediate” or “strict” scrutiny, then the 
 258.  Criticizing Kennedy’s opinions in both Lawrence and Roper v. Simmons, Posner charges 
that “[t]hey are startlingly frank appeals to moral principles that a great many Americans either 
disagree with or think inapplicable to gay rights and juvenile murderers.”  Richard A. Posner, 
Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 84 (2005).  We believe, to the contrary: (1) 
that Kennedy appropriately appeals to these principles qua constitutional principles, not qua moral 
principles; (2) that it is not clear that a great many Americans do disagree with the relevant 
principles; and (3) that the Court does not owe deference to popular disagreements regarding how 
or whether genuine constitutional principles apply to given facts (i.e., regarding how principles are 
activated).
 259.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 260.  Id. at 599.  
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challenged law can be invalidated only if it is irrational to believe that it 
promotes even a barely legitimate interest. 
But the tiers of scrutiny are judge-crafted “decision rules” designed to 
“implement” our constitutional law.261  They are not accurate renditions of 
what our constitutional principles serve up.  And however binding those tests 
are on lower courts, many Justices believe they do not fully bind the Supreme 
Court.  Kennedy had been willing, in Lopez, to resolve constitutional 
disputes by attending directly to the balance of underlying principles, neither 
applying existing judge-crafted doctrine nor announcing new doctrine.  
That’s plausibly what he’s doing here. 
If Lawrence is neither obscure nor implausible, the inconsistency
objections remain.  There are two: (1) even if there might be adequate 
grounds to disregard stare decisis and overturn Bowers, doing so is 
inconsistent with the test laid out in Casey,262 and (2) Kennedy’s substantive 
due process analysis is “incompatible” with the “deeply-rooted-in-history-
and-tradition” standard of Glucksberg—an opinion Kennedy joined.263
There is some merit to these objections.  But not enough, we think, to 
significantly undermine or question Kennedy’s integrity or competence.  
That Kennedy credited the precedential force of Roe but not Bowers is 
understandable when one recalls that stare decisis is “a series of prudential 
and pragmatic considerations”—that is, a principle—and not a set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions—that is, a rule.264  The degree to which 
a principle is activated depends on the facts of a specific case.  As for the 
inconsistency with Glucksberg, it is doubtful that Kennedy ever embraced 
the strict “deeply-rooted-in-history-and-tradition” standard announced there, 
even though he joined the opinion.  Indeed, in City of Sacramento v. Lewis,
a case decided one term after Glucksberg, Kennedy concurred to insist “that 
history and tradition are the starting point, but not in all cases the ending 
point of the substantive due process inquiry.”265 Lawrence is continuous 
with this understanding of constitutional liberty. 
The constitutionality of state laws denying recognition to same-sex 
couples lay in the background of Romer, and barely offstage in Lawrence.266
 261.  See supra note 102 and accompanying text.  
 262.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 592 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[I]t . . . should surprise no one, that 
the Court has chosen today to revise the standards of stare decisis set forth in Casey.  It has thereby 
exposed Casey’s extraordinary deference to precedent for the result-oriented expedient that it is.”).  
 263.  See Calabresi, supra note 21. 
 264.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (plurality opinion).  
  265.  City of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1988) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 266.  The Massachusetts Supreme Court decided Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 
N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), the first case to recognize a right to gay marriage, five months after 
Lawrence.
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It assumed center stage in Obergefell.267  We think the issue easy for 
principled positivism given highly plausible assumptions about the rough 
shape and weight of relevant principles of LIBERTY and DIGNITY.  First, the 
legal institution of marriage is of massive instrumental value: it facilitates 
adults’ ability to accumulate and control material wealth, direct their 
children’s upbringing, and ensure that a trusted intimate has legal power to 
make decisions for their welfare in cases of illness or incompetence.  Second, 
excluding same-sex couples from an institution of this importance and social 
significance demeans, degrades, and insults gays, lesbians, and bisexuals. 
This is essentially how Justice Kennedy saw things in Obergefell. The 
opinion is hard to parse.  We do not think it a model of judicial craftsmanship.  
But he got the crux of the matter exactly right.  First, “marriage is ‘one of 
the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free 
men.’”268  Second, the exclusion of same-sex couples from the marriage right 
“is to put the imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion that soon demeans 
or stigmatizes” gays and lesbians, and “serves to disrespect and subordinate 
them.”269  In sum, withholding legal recognition of same-sex unions is 
 267.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).  
 268.  Id. at 2598 (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)). 
 269.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602, 2604. 
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unconstitutional because of the “interrelation of the two principles” of liberty 
and equality.270
The opinion provoked two main objections, both fairly captured by 
Roberts’s intemperate dissent.  First, obscurity.  “The central point,” Roberts 
observed, “seems to be that there is a ‘synergy between’ the Equal Protection 
Clause and the Due Process Clause.”  But, he complained, the supposed 
interaction between the Clauses “is quite frankly, difficult to follow.”271
Second, mysteriousness: “There is, after all, no ‘Companionship and 
Understanding’ or ‘Nobility and Dignity’ Clause in the Constitution.”272
By now we hope it clear why neither objection is compelling.  The first 
assumes a clause-boundedness that principled positivism rejects.  The 
assumption that rights can reside only in discrete clauses of the constitutional 
text denies what principled positivism affirms—namely, that principles 
determine rules aggregatively.  And Roberts’s mysteriousness objection 
merely reprises Chemerinsky’s objection to Kennedy’s Alden decision from 
the other side of the aisle.  Roberts is wrong for the same reason: principles 
that do not correspond to, and are not encoded in, portions of the 
constitutional text are nevertheless the fundamental norms of our 
constitutional system.  Sure, maybe Obergefell was wrongly decided.  But 
Roberts’s charge that “[t]he majority’s decision is an act of will, not legal 
judgment,”273 is a slander. 
Kennedy’s last opinion concerning gay rights, his majority opinion in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,274 supplies a 
fitting coda.  That case raised the question whether a state could compel a 
Christian baker to supply a cake for a same-sex wedding against his religious 
and expressive scruples.  As one of a spate of similar controversies pitting 
antidiscrimination norms against claims sounding in rights of conscience, 
compelled speech, and religious exercise, it had been anticipated as one of 
the major cases of the 2017 Term.  In the event, Kennedy wrote for six 
Justices to hold for the baker.  But the grounds were so narrow—that anti-
religious animus fatally infected deliberations by a state civil rights 
commission when ruling on his request for an exemption—that some 
observers questioned who actually won the case,275 and others disparaged the 
 270.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603. 
 271.  Id. at 2623 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting). 
 272.  Id. at 2616. 
 273.  Id. at 2612. 
 274.  Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civ. Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
 275.  See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, The Press Is Wrong on Masterpiece Cakeshop. The Baker 
Lost., THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (June 5, 2018), http://prospect.org/article/press-wrong-on-
masterpiece-cakeshop-baker-lost (“The Court’s opinion provides no tangible help for the baker or 
other religious objectors to antidiscrimination laws.”).  The ACLU, who represented the couple 
refused service, claimed the decision as a “win.”  James Esseks, In Masterpiece, the Bakery Wins 
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opinion as “the worst form of judicial minimalism,” lacking “both 
intellectual clarity and moral courage.”276
This criticism is too harsh.  With many critics, we believe that Kennedy 
exaggerates the degree of anti-religious hostility that the baker, Jack Phillips, 
encountered at the commission level, and are unpersuaded that whatever 
hostility he did confront indelibly tainted all subsequent state proceedings.277
But these cases are hard.  They’re hard for just the reason that Kennedy, 
flying his principled-positivist flag, would emphasize: they “present[] 
difficult questions as to the proper reconciliation of at least two principles.  
The first is the authority of a State . . . to protect the rights and dignity of gay 
persons . . . .  The second is the right of all persons to exercise fundamental 
freedoms under the First Amendment . . . .”278
In our judgment, some liberals oversimplify these cases by indulging 
analogies to racial discrimination too uncritically.279  Certainly, a wedding 
vendor who harbored genuine religious objections to “race-mixing” would 
lack a constitutional right not to serve interracial couples.280  But that needn’t 
be because RESPECT RELIGIOUS BELIEF & PRACTICE doesn’t count among 
our constitutional principles.  It could be because our constitutional 
commitment to RACIAL EQUALITY is great enough to overwhelm whatever 
principles might militate for an exemption.  Certainly, principles concerning 
the Battle but Loses the War, ACLU.ORG (June 4, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/blog/lgbt-
rights/lgbt-nondiscrimination-protections/masterpiece-bakery-wins-battle-loses-war. 
 276.  Richard Epstein, The worst form of judicial minimalism—Masterpiece Cakeshop
deserved a full vindication for its claims of religious liberty and free speech, SCOTUSBLOG (June 
4, 2018), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/symposium-the-worst-form-of-judicial-minimalism 
-masterpiece-cakeshop-deserved-a-full-vindication-for-its-claims-of-religious-liberty-and-free-
speech/. See also Mark Joseph Stern, Gay Americans Have Little to Fear From the Supreme 
Court’s Compromise in Masterpiece Cakeshop, SLATE (June 4, 2018), https://slate.com/news-and-
politics/2018/06/the-supreme-courts-decision-in-masterpiece-cakeshop-is-a-kennedy-compro 
mise.html (deriding the decision as “a Kennedy special” that is “largely filler”). 
 277.  Cf. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1749 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The different 
outcomes the Court features do not evidence hostility to religion of the kind we have previously 
held to signal a free-exercise violation, nor do the comments by one or two members of one of the 
four decision making entities considering this case justify reversing the judgment below.”).
 278.  Id. at 1723. 
 279.  In an amicus brief, the NAACP made this argument explicitly: “The logic of Piggie Park
and other precedents overwhelmingly rejecting religious justifications for racial discrimination 
apply squarely to the context of LGBTQ discrimination.”  Brief for NAACP Legal Defense & 
Education Fund as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado 
Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (No. 16-1111) (citing Newman v. Piggie Park 
Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400 (1962) (per curiam)). See also Vanita Gupta, Discrimination Is Not a 
Fundamental American Value, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 12, 2017), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/ 
09/symposium-discrimination-not-fundamental-american-value/. 
 280.  Indeed, that is the upshot of Piggie Park. 390 U.S. at 402, n.5 (rejecting as “patently 
frivolous” the contention that public accommodation requirement of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
was unconstitutional because it interfered with the defendant’s free exercise of religion).  
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dignity and equality could weigh with comparable force when LGBTQ rights 
and interests are at stake.  But that can’t be assumed.  Our principles need 
not conform to demands of logical or moral consistency.  They are the 
product of historical contingency and social forces.  Masterpiece Cakeshop
is Kennedy’s reminder that many constitutional principles populate our 
constitutional firmament, that their contours and contents are not always 
clear, that it can be difficult to determine how they net out over a range of 
diverse fact patterns, and, therefore, that proceeding slowly and narrowly is 
often wise, not cowardly. 
D.  Race
We cannot attempt a remotely thorough assessment of Kennedy’s 
jurisprudence on race in this already long Article.  There are too many cases 
on too many different topics.  Throughout his long judicial career, Kennedy 
has been a mostly orthodox and reliable vote for conservative outcomes, 
consistently invalidating race-conscious admissions programs and set 
asides,281 frustrating efforts to desegregate public schools,282 and rejecting 
statutory and constitutional challenges to racially gerrymandered districts.283
The decisions he joined attracted criticism from the left, but nothing about 
Kennedy’s performance on race contributed much fuel to the personal
whimsy fire. 
That changed two years ago, in Fisher II, when Kennedy wrote for a 4-
3 Court (Scalia deceased, Kagan recused) to uphold a program of race-based 
admissions preferences at the University of Texas.284  When the program had 
visited the Court three terms earlier, in Fisher I, Kennedy had written for 
seven justices to vacate a lower court ruling for the university, and to instruct 
the appellate court to apply more searching review.  “The University must 
prove that the means chosen by the University to attain diversity are narrowly 
tailored to that goal,” he emphasized.  “On this point, the University receives 
281. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment); Adarand Constructions, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); 
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (benign race-
conscious federal policies).  See also Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (labor law). 
 282.  See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 
(1995); Bd. of Ed. of Oklahoma City v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991) (school desegregation).  
 283.  See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Miller v. 
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (racial 
gerrymandering). See also Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, (2000) (race-conscious, local voting 
limitations) 
 284.  Fisher v. University of Texas (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).  
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no deference.”285  On remand, the Fifth Circuit again upheld the program, 
leading Court watchers to anticipate another reversal.286  Yet Kennedy 
upheld the program, concluding that Texas “articulated precise and concrete 
goals” supported “by significant evidence, both statistical and anecdotal, in 
support of the University’s position,” that race conscious considerations 
were needed to achieve the educational benefits that flow from diversity.287
Alito in dissent objected spiritedly that the majority opinion was 
inconsistent with the hornbook understanding of strict scrutiny and with 
Kennedy’s own previous insistence, in Grutter and Fisher I, that the test 
must be applied rigorously and nondeferentially.288  While “the University 
has still not identified with any degree of specificity the interests that its use 
of race and ethnicity is supposed to serve,” Alito complained, “the Court 
inexplicably grants” a “plea for deference that we emphatically rejected in 
our prior decision.”289  Onlookers agreed, proclaiming that Fisher II
“betrays” Kennedy’s “previous equal protection jurisprudence and the belief 
that we have a colorblind Constitution,”290 and deeming it “a deplorable 
misfire.”291  As Richard Primus wryly observed in the New York Times:
“[T]he most deceptive thing about [Fisher] is its first words: ‘Justice 
Kennedy delivered the opinion of the court.’”292
We cannot fully reconcile Fisher II with its predecessors.  We agree 
with critics that Kennedy’s opinion defers to the state on narrow tailoring in 
a way that Grutter and Fisher I forbid.  Instead of trying to erase all traces 
of inconsistency, we will content ourselves with explaining its source.  In 
our view, two points are essential to understanding Kennedy’s jurisprudence 
surrounding race. First, like his fellow conservatives, and unlike his liberal 
colleagues, Kennedy believes that colorblindness is a feature of our 
constitutional order.  Second, and in contrast to the most conservative 
justices, he believes that colorblindness is a constitutional principle, not a 
constitutional rule.
Kennedy’s commitment to COLORBLINDNESS is manifest.  As he 
insisted in his Croson concurrence: “The moral imperative of racial 
 285.  Fisher v. University of Texas (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013).  
 286.  See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes et al., Judging Opportunity Lost: Assessing the Viability of 
Race-Based Affirmative Action after Fisher v. University of Texas, 62 UCLA L. REV. 271 (2015).  
 287.  Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2210–11.  
 288.  Id. at 2215 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 289.  Id.
 290.  Elizabeth Slattery, A Disappointing Decision, But More Lawsuits Are On The Way,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 23, 2016), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-a-disappointing-
decision-but-more-lawsuits-are-on-the-way/.
 291.  Kirsanow, supra note 27. 
 292.  Richard Primus, Affirmative Action in College Admissions, Here to Stay, N.Y. TIMES
(June 23, 2016), http://nyti.ms/28PLjIN. 
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neutrality is the driving force of the Equal Protection Clause.”293  In a Voting 
Rights Act case, Kennedy reiterated that “racial and ethnic distinctions of 
any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial 
examination.”294  All the same, Kennedy has made clear in cases involving 
affirmative action that he differs from his more conservative colleagues in 
refusing to assign COLORBLINDNESS decisive force.  In Grutter, most 
notably, he joined Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas in dissenting from a 
decision that upheld race-based admissions preferences at the University of 
Michigan Law School.  But he pointedly refused to sign onto Scalia’s dissent 
that flatly pronounced that “[t]he Constitution proscribes government 
discrimination on the basis of race.”295  Instead, he wrote separately to 
“reiterate [his] approval of giving appropriate consideration to race in this 
one context,” even while finding that the program at issue failed searching 
review.296
Just as revealing is Kennedy’s opinion in Parents Involved, involving 
challenges to student assignment plans adopted by two public school districts 
that used student race as a tiebreaker when allocating slots in schools that are 
racially imbalanced relative to the district as a whole.  Kennedy joined his 
conservative colleagues to make five votes to invalidate the challenged 
programs.  But he refused to join portions of Roberts’s majority opinion, 
objecting that they “imply an all-too-unyielding insistence that race cannot 
be a factor in instances when, in my view, it may be taken into account.”297
In particular, Roberts’s “plurality opinion is too dismissive of the legitimate 
interest government has in ensuring all people have equal opportunity 
regardless of their race.”298  Referring to the first Justice Harlan’s aphorism 
that “Our Constitution is color-blind”, Kennedy observed that, “as an 
aspiration, Justice Harlan’s axiom must command our assent. In the real 
world, it is regrettable to say, it cannot be a universal constitutional 
principle.”299
It’s not clear what “universal constitutional principle” means, exactly. 
The adjective “universal” suggests that a principle would qualify only if it 
holds true in, say, Bangladesh as it does in the United States.  We doubt that 
was Kennedy’s concern, and therefore that “universal” is the modifier he 
 293.  City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 518 (1989) (concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
 294.  Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904 (1995) (internal quotation omitted). 
 295.  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 296.  Id. at 395 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 297.  Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 787 (2007) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).  
 298.  Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 551 U.S. at 788.  
 299.  Id.
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sought.  We propose “absolute” as a friendly substitute.  That would yield: 
COLORBLINDNESS is not an “absolute constitutional principle”—i.e., a 
rule—because other principles of our order—e.g., ANTI-CASTE, EQUAL 
OPPORTUNITY—combine with the actual facts of “the real world” to 
sometimes require or allow government attention to race.300
Where does this leave us on Fisher II?  Not with the conclusion that if 
you cock your head and squint, you’ll see that the Texas program satisfied 
hornbook strict scrutiny.  Rather, we surmise, the continued use of, and 
support for, race-conscious admissions by university administrators and 
elected state office holders, not all of whom were ideologically disposed to 
favor race-based preferences, helped persuade Kennedy that, contrary to his 
previous hopes and beliefs, rigorously non-deferential scrutiny would prove 
fatal to programs that really are reasonably necessary for the promotion of 
racial justice.  In short, we speculate that Kennedy realized that political and 
university leaders acting in good faith may be unable to establish, under non-
deferential review, that any given race-conscious admissions program does 
satisfy narrow tailoring.  And if nothing that “works” satisfies an honest 
application of strict scrutiny, then its continued and rigorous application will 
produce states of affairs that COLORBLINDNESS could not compel without 
overriding other genuine principles of our constitutional regime.  Continued 
application of strict scrutiny would allow COLORBLINDNESS to predominate 
unduly over constitutional principles—e.g., ANTI-CASTE, DIVERSITY, EQUAL 
OPPORTUNITY—that, in practice, require special solicitude for the interests 
and welfare of African-Americans and other racial minorities.  Kennedy was 
(rightly) unwilling to sacrifice these other constitutional principles on the 
altar of COLORBLINDNESS.
E.  Law of Democracy   
We have emphasized that, lacking a canonical list of Kennedy’s most 
notorious opinions, this Article inescapably slights decisions worth 
discussing.  But if our investigation ended here, one opinion above all would 
 300.  Similarly, in Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant 
Rights & Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), Kennedy joined a 6-2 majority to 
uphold a state constitutional amendment that prohibited race-based affirmative action in public 
university admissions.  572 U.S. 291, 298 (2014) (plurality opinion).  But whereas Scalia and 
Thomas would have upheld the amendment on the ground that the Equal Protection Clause cannot 
“forbid what its text plainly requires,” Id. at 316 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment), Kennedy’s 
three-Justice plurality opinion reached the same result only after entertaining other somewhat 
countervailing constitutional principles—“that consideration of race in admissions is permissible, 
provided that certain conditions are met,” and “that when hurt or injury is inflicted on racial 
minorities by the encouragement or command of laws or other state action, the Constitution requires 
redress by the courts”—and finding them not activated on the facts.  Id. at 313 (plurality opinion).  
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be conspicuous by its absence: Kennedy’s opinion for a five-justice majority 
in Citizens United.301
Citizens United is a nonprofit corporation, funded mostly by donations 
from individuals, founded to promote conservative causes and political 
candidates.  In 2008, it produced and distributed a 90-minute documentary 
highly critical of Hillary Clinton, then battling Barack Obama for the 
Democratic presidential nomination.  The federal Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), however, prohibited corporations and unions 
from expending general treasury funds on “electioneering communications” 
that clearly reference a candidate for federal office, and are made 30 days 
before a primary election, or 60 days before a general election.302  Wanting 
to distribute its documentary by video-on-demand within the 30-day pre-
primary window, Citizens United sought a ruling that, as applied to it, the 
BCRA’s restrictions would violate the First Amendment. 
The Court had previously allowed restrictions on corporate political 
speech in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce303 and, relying on 
Austin, had upheld the BCRA in McConnell v. FEC.304  That’s why Citizens 
United pressed an as-applied challenge.  It could have prevailed on that basis, 
or on several others.  The Court could have ruled, on statutory grounds, that 
a feature-length film distributed through video-on-demand does not qualify 
as an “electioneering communication.”  Or the Court could have followed 
several lower courts that had exempted nonprofits that, like Citizens United, 
accept only a de minimis amount of money from for-profit corporations or 
unions from the BCRA’s reach.305  But, worried that any narrow ruling in 
Citizen United’s favor would unduly chill protected expression, Kennedy’s 
majority opinion for the five conservatives opted for a broad rule that 
required the overruling of Austin and portions of McConnell: “Government 
may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate 
identity.”306
The rule’s unnecessary breadth, the overruling of Supreme Court 
precedents that it necessitated, the judicial machinations that produced it,307
 301.  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).   
 302.  Id. at 321. 
 303.  494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 304.  540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 305.  See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 405–08 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (identifying these 
possibilities); id. at 322–36 (majority opinion) (assessing and rejecting any “narrower grounds” for 
decision).
 306.  Id. at 365. 
 307.  The backstory is recounted in Jeffrey Toobin, Money Unlimited, THE NEW YORKER
(May, 21 2012), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/05/21/money-unlimited.  Stevens 
put it tersely but not unfairly: “Essentially, five Justices were unhappy with the limited nature of 
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the analytical weaknesses in the majority opinion that defended it, and the 
partisan interests that it advanced, all combined to elicit outrage from the 
left. In an indignant dissent running over eighty pages, the characteristically 
mild-mannered Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, and 
Sotomayor, complained that “The Court’s ruling threatens to undermine the 
integrity of elected institutions across the Nation.”  Moreover, he feared, “the 
path it has taken to reach its outcome will . . . do damage to this 
institution.”308  Critics were less restrained.  Larry Lessig was “dumbfounded 
by [Kennedy’s] tone-deaf” opinion;309 Rick Hasen concluded that elements 
of Kennedy’s opinion “sound more like the rantings of a right-wing talk 
show host than the rational view of a justice with a sense of political 
realism.”310
The five opinions in the case consumed 175 pages in the United States 
Reports, and provoked voluminous commentary.311  We will cut to the pith.  
One needn’t be a card-carrying principled positivist to believe that the 
constitutionality of corporate campaign finance restrictions implicates (at 
least) two constitutional principles pushing in opposed directions.  The first 
principle (or cluster of principles) travels under varied verbal formulae: self-
governance, republicanism, and “democratic integrity,” among others.  
We’ll call it POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY, and gloss it as providing (to a first 
pass) that “the People” should not face unnecessary obstacles to the 
intelligent and effective exercise of their sovereign power.  Because 
corporations can amass vast financial resources that they use to curry favor 
with office holders and to swamp divergent voices of individual flesh-and-
blood members of the polity, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY favors some limits on 
corporate campaign expenditures are permissible.  On the other hand, of 
course, lies the principle cluster FREE SPEECH, which, so long as money 
counts as speech, opposes any such restrictions.  Furthermore, recall that this 
wasn’t a case of first judicial impression.  The Court had already upheld 
tailored restrictions on corporate campaign expenditures in Austin and 
McConnell.  So STARE DECISIS was a third principle.  Other principles might 
the case before us, so they changed the case to give themselves an opportunity to change the law.”  
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 398 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 308.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 396 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 309.  Lawrence Lessig, Institutional Integrity: Citizens United and the Path to a Better 
Democracy, HUFFPOST (Mar. 24, 2010), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-less 
ig/institutional-integrity-c_b_433394.html. 
 310.  Richard L. Hasen, Money Grubbers, SLATE (Jan. 21, 2010), https://slate.com/news-and-
politics/2010/01/the-supreme-court-kills-campaign-finance-reform-in-citizens-united.html.   
 311.  See Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 SUP.
CT. REV. 103, 111 (2010) (“Citizens United spawned an immediate torrent of academic and more 
popular reactions and commentary, surely as much as any Supreme Court decision since Bush v 
Gore.”).  
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be implicated too (e.g., FRAMERS’ INTENT, WHAT THE TEXT SAYS,
HISTORICAL PRACTICE), but plainly no fewer than three principles bore on 
the issue, with two favoring the constitutional permissibility of restrictions, 
and one opposing.  This, more or less, is how the dissent saw things. 
The majority viewed matters very differently.  To Justice Kennedy, this 
was, from start to finish, a case about FREE SPEECH.  And it’s not only a FREE 
SPEECH case: it’s one in which that single principle exerts overwhelming 
force: “If the First Amendment has any force, it prohibits Congress from 
fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for simply engaging in 
political speech.”312  What about the fact that the speakers whose free speech 
rights are infringed are artificial persons, themselves creations of law?  
Irrelevant.  Not only does “First Amendment protection exten[d] to 
corporations,”313 but the extent of that protection is the same.314  Does it 
matter that the expenditure restrictions at issue are limited in scope, 
somewhat analogous to “time, place, and manner” restrictions?315  Nope.  
The BCRA “is an outright ban,” a “classic exampl[e] of censorship.”316  In 
short, on Kennedy’s view, we have a constitutional principle of great weight 
 312.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349. 
 313.  Id. at 342. 
 314.  Id. at 343 (“The Court has rejected the argument that political speech should be treated 
differently under the First Amendment simply because such associations are not ‘natural 
persons’”).
 315.  Id. at 419 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In many ways, . . . § 203 functions as a source 
restriction or a time, place, and manner restriction. . . . [T]he majority’s incessant talk of a ‘ban’ 
aims at a straw man.”). 
 316.  Id. at 337. 
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or importance activated very fully toward no corporate campaign 
expenditure restrictions. 
To be sure, given Austin and McConnell, STARE DECISIS presses the 
other way, toward the constitutionality of expenditure restrictions such as 
those embodied in the BCRA.  But that principle weighed weakly here 
because, in Kennedy’s estimation, Austin was itself “a significant departure” 
from previous cases.317  And POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY?  Not implicated.  
Kennedy granted that the principle would support restrictions on corporate 
campaign contributions given that funds donated directly to candidates could 
risk quid pro quo corruption or its appearance.  But, he concluded, POPULAR 
SOVEREIGNTY weighs not at all in favor of restrictions on independent 
expenditures: “independent expenditures, including those made by 
corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of 
corruption.”318
Three differences between the majority’s and dissent’s analyses leap 
out.  Kennedy: (1) believes that FREE SPEECH activates much more forcefully 
against restrictions on corporate campaign expenditures; (2) adjudges that 
judicial precedents press less forcefully in favor of the constitutional 
permissibility of such restrictions; and (3) entirely sidelines POPULAR 
SOVEREIGNTY.  On all three points, we find Stevens’s dissent substantially 
more persuasive.  In our view, Kennedy’s opinion inflates the force of FREE
SPEECH on this issue by overstating the censorial character of the legislative 
restrictions, and by grossly understating (to nothing) the constitutional 
significance of the difference between human beings and corporations.  At 
 317.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 319 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment) (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U. S. 449, 490 (2007).  
 318.  Id. at 357. 
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the same time, it minimizes the force of STARE DECISIS by relying on dissents 
to exaggerate Austin’s departure from past practice. 
Even more striking and disconcerting is the majority’s neutering of 
POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY.  Criticizing “the majority’s myopic focus on quid 
pro quo scenarios,” Stevens maintained that a “broader understanding of 
corruption has deep roots in the Nation’s history.”319  And observing that 
“[t]he Framers were obsessed with corruption, which they understood to 
encompass the dependency of public officeholders on private interests,” he 
concluded, dolefully, that “the Framers had their minds trained on a threat to 
republican self-government that this Court has lost sight of.”320  We fear this 
is true.  Worse, once the majority “effectively discounts” the bearing of 
POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY in this case “to zero,”321 then, putting judicial 
precedents aside—as the majority promptly does—we are left with a single 
constitutional principle doing all the work.  This is no longer pluralism. 
In short, if any of Kennedy’s most notorious opinions lends support to 
personal whimsy, Citizens United (in our judgment) is it.322  This is not to 
contend that any non-whimsical analysis faithful to our constitutional 
principles must side with the dissent.  It’s to acknowledge that the 
combination of steps that the majority opinion takes to reach its 
constitutional bottom line raises eyebrows sharply.  Our least cynical 
explanation draws on two suggestions about Kennedy’s constitutional 
vision: that he is preoccupied with FREE SPEECH, and that he is curiously 
insensitive to POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY.  If true, then Citizens United, though 
(in our view) profoundly misguided, may be seen, not as the product of 
personal whimsy, but as illustrating what happens when an obsession meets 
a blindspot. 
That Kennedy was something of a FREE SPEECH fetishist is well 
known.323  That he was nearly blind to POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY is not.  We 
close this section by demonstrating that POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY is oddly 
AWOL from another of Kennedy’s criticized opinions—his concurrence in 
the 2004 partisan gerrymandering case, Vieth v. Jubelirer324—and we explain 
why it matters. 
 319.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 451 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 320.  Id. at 452 (internal quotations and citations omitted).  
 321.  Id. at 463. 
 322.  Among other defects, Kennedy’s effort to distinguish his one-term-old majority opinion 
in Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co. rings especially false.  See id. at 458–60 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).
 323.  See e.g., Eugene Volokh, How the Justices Voted in Free Speech Cases, 1994-2000, 48 
UCLA L. REV. 1191 (2001) (finding, among the nine members of the Court, Kennedy most 
consistently took a maximalist free speech position). 
 324.  Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
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Vieth involved a constitutional challenge to an extreme partisan 
gerrymander by the Republican-controlled Pennsylvania legislature.  For the 
first time, all nine justices agreed that excessive partisanship in redistricting 
is unconstitutional.  But they couldn’t agree on a judicially manageable 
standard to police it.  Concluding that none could be crafted, the four most 
conservative justices would have held all such claims nonjusticiable.  The 
four liberal justices believed that a standard could be devised, and 
collectively proposed three. Kennedy found none of the proposed standards 
acceptable, but thought it premature to foreclose the possibility of crafting 
one, as his more conservative colleagues would. 
Despite criticisms,325 we believe that Kennedy’s concurrence makes 
great sense, until the last step.  As we parse the opinion, Kennedy starts by 
asking, sensibly, what’s the rule? No partisanship in redistricting?  Can’t be.  
Whatever principles might support it, HISTORICAL PRACTICE weighs heavily 
against.  No excessive partisanship in redistricting?  Possible.  But it’s not a 
constitutional rule that courts can administer; it’s not a “judicially 
manageable standard.”  Happily, the Supreme Court has constitutional 
authority to craft doctrinal “tests” to implement the balance of principles in 
a more manageable fashion.326  To craft a test here, however, we need to 
know what is meant by “excessive.”  Excessive by reference to what 
standard?  Until we know that, we cannot determine whether any proposed 
test, no matter how administrable, adequately fits the constitutional wrong.  
And to give content to the amorphous notion of “excessive partisanship,” we 
must identify the constitutional principles that drive no excessive 
partisanship in redistricting in the first place. 
To this point, we are singing in unison.  So, which constitutional 
principles do regulate partisan gerrymandering?  POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
must be an obvious possibility.  Indeed, Breyer made it the centerpiece of his 
dissent.327  And Kennedy?  After observing that we lack standards of 
districting fairness drawn from the Equal Protection Clause, Kennedy 
suggested (no surprise) that “[t]he First Amendment may be the more 
relevant constitutional provision.”328  Maybe.  But if not that, what else?  
 325.  Vieth, 541 U.S. at 304 (plurality opinion) (chiding Kennedy for proposing a disposition 
that “is not legally available”). 
 326.  See supra note 102. 
 327.  Vieth, 541 U.S. at 356 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I start with a fundamental principle.  ‘We 
the People,’ who ‘ordained and established’ the American Constitution, sought to create and to 
protect a workable form of government that is in its principles, structure, and whole mass, basically 
democratic.  In a modern Nation of close to 300 million people, the workable democracy that the 
Constitution foresees must mean more than a guaranteed opportunity to elect legislators 
representing equally populous districts.  There must also be a method for transforming the will of 
the majority into effective government.”) (internal citations omitted).  
 328.  Id. at 314 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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Despite flirting with POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY in his concluding paragraph,329
Kennedy never took seriously that principles of self-governance can do the 
sort of work that, elsewhere, he (rightly) accords other structural principles 
central to our constitutional tradition since the founding, such as 
FEDERALISM and SEPARATION OF POWERS.  This is a substantive, not a 
nominal, point.  Once POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY is on the table, we can 
conceptualize the harms that extreme partisan gerrymandering inflicts in 
terms of injury to the body politic, or to the institution of republican self-
governance itself.330  By ignoring the relevance of this principle, Kennedy 
can conceive of the injury only in terms of unequal “burdens” that 
gerrymanders can impose on individuals’ “representational rights.”331  This 
is a very partial and distorting lens on the nature of the problem.332
Under whatever designation, it is a principle of our constitutional order 
that the People must be able to effectuate its sovereign will unhindered by 
unnecessary obstacles.  In an age of oligarchy, unrestricted corporate 
influence in political campaigns offends that principle.  In an age of big data 
and supercomputing, unrestricted political gerrymandering offends it too.  
To the extent that these practices do threaten or injure republican self-
governance, then POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY militates toward constitutional 
rules such as it is constitutionally permissible for Congress to restrict 
corporate campaign expenditures and it is constitutionally prohibited for 
state legislatures to design districts to excessively insulate a favored party 
from declining popularity in the electorate at large.  To be sure, that this 
principle might militate for these rules over their negations does not by itself 
establish what, all things considered, our constitutional rules are; that’s a 
lesson of pluralism.  But one thing is certain: we cannot reach warranted 
judgments about the constitutional status of these challenged practices so 
long as we ignore POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY entirely, or minimize its 
activation to nothing by assuming an unrealistic picture of our political 
reality.  Kennedy could have done better.333
 329.  Vieth, 541 U.S. at 316 (“The ordered working of our Republic, and of the democratic 
process, depends on a sense of decorum and restraint in all branches of government, and in the 
citizenry itself.”). 
 330.  Cf. Id. at 367 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the “risk of harm to basic democratic 
principles”).
 331.  Vieth, 541 U.S. passim (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 332.  See Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 28, 58–59 (2004) (“The instinct to turn to the First Amendment reflects a recurring search for 
grounding in familiar and conventional models of individual rights.  But those models will provide 
no solace in addressing structural problems concerning the proper allocation of political 
representation.”).
 333.  Kennedy appeared poised to craft doctrine to enforce the constitutional rule against 
excessively partisan gerrymandering when, in 2017, the Court granted cert in a handful of cases 
challenging state gerrymanders.  See Gil v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (challenging 
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V.  Appraisal and Lessons 
Part IV has painted a rather pretty picture of Kennedy’s constitutional 
jurisprudence.  Some readers will find it too pretty.  Against our tentative 
and tempered defense of Kennedy as a reputable principled positivist, 
committed proponents of personal whimsy are likely to argue: First, that 
Kennedy simply makes up the contents or weights of the principles that he 
invokes; or second, that, to the extent he identifies genuine constitutional 
principles, he deploys them opportunistically, invoking or omitting them, 
understating or exaggerating the degree of their activation, to accord with his 
fancies.334  Either way, they conclude, Kennedy may be a “Justice of 
principles,” but not a “principled Justice.”  Sorry, Tony. 
The critics could be right.  Kennedy does not emerge unblemished even 
on our mostly sympathetic reconstruction, and reasonable readers might 
think us too charitable.  Still, two final observations in Kennedy’s defense 
are warranted. 
First, it’s hard to take strenuous exception to any of the principles that 
do most work in the Kennedy opinions we have examined.  On this point, 
the test is not whether Kennedy’s reliance on principles can be mocked by 
those who (claim to) believe that all genuine constitutional powers, rights, 
and duties are fixed and located only “in the text.”  It’s whether Kennedy’s 
principles resonate with those who accept principled positivism or something 
like it.  Kennedy passes that test.  His favored principles—LIBERTY,
AUTONOMY, DEMOCRACY, ANTI-CASTE, STATES MATTER, EFFECTIVE 
NATIONAL POWER, and the like—are familiar and widely (though unevenly) 
endorsed.  Kennedy does not peddle principles that should strike 
constitutional lawyers as highly eccentric—EQUAL INCOME, AGRARIANISM,
ANIMALS MATTER, or whatnot. 
Wisconsin’s state legislative redistricting plan); Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S.Ct. 543 (2017) 
(challenging Maryland’s congressional redistricting plan).  See also Richard L. Hasen, Justice 
Kennedy’s Beauty Pageant, THE ATLANTIC (June 19, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics 
/archive/2017/06/ justice-kennedys-beauty-pageant/530790/ (“The partisan gerrymandering beauty 
pageant is returning to the Supreme Court next fall for a limited engagement for an audience of 
one: Justice Anthony Kennedy.”).  That proved not so, as Kennedy tamely joined opinions that 
skirted the merits and, instead, remanded the cases on procedural grounds.  See Gil, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 
1923 (2018) (concluding plaintiffs failed to adequately establish standing); Benisek v. Lamone, 
138 S.Ct. 1942 (2018) (per curiam) (finding the preliminary injunction improperly granted).  
 334.  That was George Thomas’s complaint.  After agreeing that “[i]ndividual autonomy . . . is 
more rooted in the American constitutional tradition . . . than many of Kennedy’s critics admit,” 
and that, “despite Kennedy’s often inchoate rhetoric, his vision of individual autonomy is more 
restrained and responsible than it may seem at first glance,” Thomas concluded that “Kennedy has 
not been very good at connecting his understanding of liberty to constitutional roots” and that he 
inexplicably ignores some “liberties associated with individual autonomy—such as the right to 
choose a calling, to labor and to contract—that are as deeply rooted in American constitutionalism 
as any others.”  Thomas, supra note 53. 
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Second, while critics understandably highlight apparent 
inconsistencies, consistencies across Kennedy’s opinions often go 
underappreciated.  Many scholars have noted the continued reappearance, in 
Kennedy’s jurisprudence, of DIGNITY and LIBERTY.335  But that only 
scratches the surface.  Kennedy thoughtfully invokes many of the same 
principles across doctrinal categories—JUDICIAL INTEGRITY,336 HISTORICAL
PRACTICES MATTER,337 HORIZONTAL SEPARATION OF POWERS,338 and others. 
All that said, recall this Article’s twin ambitions: to rehabilitate 
Kennedy, and to promote principled positivism.  Frankly, we are more 
committed to the second.  So we are not deeply troubled if some readers 
friendly to principled positivism resist our judgment that Kennedy is a 
responsible practitioner.  We would be worried if reasonable doubts about 
the integrity of Kennedy’s constitutional performance could impugn 
principled positivism itself.  The pro-Kennedy argument we have put forth 
runs something like this: (1) Principled positivism is a plausible and 
attractive constitutional theory; (2) Kennedy practices principled positivism; 
therefore (3) Kennedy practices a plausible and attractive constitutional 
theory.  A skeptic of principled positivism could, by endorsing our second 
premise, hope to drive a very different conclusion: (1) Kennedy’s 
constitutional jurisprudence is “a tissue of sophistries”;339 (2) Kennedy’s 
constitutional jurisprudence is principled positivism; therefore (3) principled 
positivism is “a tissue of sophistries.” 
That disheartening conclusion might be credible if we claimed Kennedy 
as a virtuoso of principled positivism—our Hercules, as it were.  But we have 
emphasized that Kennedy exhibits only an imperfect grasp and execution of 
principled positivism.  Accordingly, unhappiness with Kennedy’s 
constitutional decision-making could cause serious difficulty for principled 
positivism only if the whimsical Kennedy of conventional wisdom is what 
principled positivism is bound to deliver.  Some critics may advance 
precisely that worry.  By encouraging justices to constitutionalize the moral 
 335.  See generally Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name 129 HARV. L. REV.
F. 16 (2015); Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions under
Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694 (2008). 
 336.  See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991) (use of race-based preemptory 
challenges); Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 601 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (qualified 
immunity); Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 889 (2009) (judicial recusal). 
 337.  See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (gay marriage); Town of 
Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1824 (2014) (public prayer); Loving v. United States, 517 
U.S. 748, 766 (court martials) 
 338.  See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 53-36 (1997) (Congress’s remedial 
power); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (line-
item veto); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 408 (1989) (sentencing guidelines).  
 339.  Lund & McGinnis, supra note 234. 
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principles of their liking under the guise of discovering and applying “our 
constitutional principles,” principled positivism, on this objection, is the 
librarian who speaks through a bullhorn.340  We do not think that Kennedy’s 
performance licenses that strong anxiety. 
More fundamentally, this is the wrong type of objection to a constitutive 
theory.  Principled positivism would be unsound if the things we call 
“constitutional principles” could not exist, or if principles could not interact 
to generate more determinate norms (rules), or if we could not gain epistemic 
access to our principles or to their interaction.  But no defects in Kennedy’s 
constitutional decision-making lend support to these conclusions or others in 
the same ballpark.  Even if Kennedy is a less able or faithful principled 
positivist than we have concluded, the better response to his failings and 
foibles is to try to see what he’s up to, understand how he goes wrong, and 
help his successors do better. 
Conclusion
No, we are not “all originalists now”341—at least not if the moniker 
retains any discriminating power.  Pace Justice Kagan, we’re not “all 
textualists”342 either.  But we are almost all (minimal) constitutional realists.  
We believe that constitutional propositions of the form “Congress has 
constitutional power to X,” or “People have a constitutional right to Y,” or 
“Zing is constitutionally prohibited,” are capable of being true, and that some 
of them are true—including some that are reasonably contested, and even 
absent an authoritative judicial ruling on point. 
Constitutional realism is wholly compatible with the belief that many 
hard constitutional questions lack determinate answers.  Furthermore, even 
to the extent that constitutional law is determinate on a given point, judicial 
review involves much more (and in some cases less) than declaring “what 
the law is.”  For both these reasons, realists can welcome, and contribute to, 
prescriptive theories that advise judges how best to perform their jobs.  For 
a constitutional realist, however, prescriptive theories supplement, but 
cannot supplant, constitutive accounts of how our constitutional norms gain 
their contents, or of what makes true constitutional propositions true.  
Remarkably, though, the catalogue of extant constitutive constitutional 
 340.  See Scalia, supra note 89, at 864 (“Originalism is, it seems to me, the librarian who talks 
too softly.”).
 341.  ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A
DEBATE 1 (2011). 
 342.  Elena Kagan, The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Kagan on the Reading of 
Statutes at 8:28 (Nov. 17, 2015), https://today.law.harvard.edu/in-scalia-lecture-kagan-discusses-
statutory-interpretation/ 
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theories is slimmer than slim—a couple of branches of contemporary 
originalism, a few Hartians and Dworkinians, and that’s about it. 
We have argued that Kennedy’s constitutional jurisprudence displays a 
genuine constitutive alternative to originalism—in broad strokes, the account 
that one of us has dubbed “principled positivism” and explicated in other 
work.  Concededly, Kennedy does not represent an ideal type.  Now that his 
thirty-year tenure on the Court has ended, and constitutional lawyers need 
no longer tailor their arguments to win his often-decisive vote, the inclination 
to dismiss him as a hack will only grow.  It should be resisted.  No member 
of the Court is a paragon of theoretical consistency.  As Scalia and Thomas 
are “originalists,” as Breyer is a “pragmatist,” as Brennan was a “moral 
reader,” and as O’Connor was a “minimalist,” in much the same (imperfect) 
way is Kennedy a “principled positivist.”  We can deepen our grasp of the 
constitutional law that he helped to shape, and enrich our appreciation for 
the range of constitutional approaches reasonably available, by taking more 
seriously the possibility that, just perhaps, Kennedy had been on to 
something all along. 
